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IF ONE MENTIONS ONLINE CONTRACT FORMATION students and academics intuitively turn to the legal
rules. This interpretive community seems less than convinced that the distinctive features of the virtu-
al environment have new insights to offer. Whether that is likely to be the case cannot be ascertained
if we continue to map our understanding of online contract formation in accordance with the textbook
tradition of contract law. An illustration of this pattern of analysis can be seen by the way that discus-
sion and analysis of online contract formation frequently focuses on two issues: first, the applicability
of contract principles and, second, the shortcomings of the Electronic Commerce (EC Directive)
Regulations 2002. The paper demonstrates the following: (a) that, to the extent that the rules of con-
tract formation are relevant, they provide a preliminary and not a final point of understanding; (b) that
the dominant role of computers in structuring and processing communications makes it critical to iden-
tify the values embedded in the technological infrastructure; and (c) that the narrative of values in the
technological infrastructure provides a better route to understanding online contract formation. The
layer principle, it is suggested, provides an appropriate basis for reconciling contract doctrine with the
central role of the Regulations. The paper concludes that attempts to understand the governance chal-
lenges for online contract formation through legal rules are misplaced. To understand the contempo-
rary role of contract we need to integrate the communications systems of hardware and software into
our understanding of what it is that gives commitments their binding character.
SI L’ON MENTIONNE LA FORMATION DE CONTRAT EN LIGNE, d’emblée les étudiantes, les étudiants, les
chercheuses et les chercheurs s’en remettent aux règles de droit. Cette communauté formée à l’inter-
prétation semble douter que l’environnement virtuel, avec ses particularités, puisse offrir des idées nou-
velles. Il est difficile de trancher si c’est oui ou non le cas, si nous cherchons toujours à comprendre la
formation des contrats en ligne à partir des règles traditionnelles énoncées dans les ouvrages sur le
droit des contrats. Ce modèle traditionnel ressort clairement dans la discussion et l’analyse de la for-
mation des contrats en ligne qui souvent tournent autour de deux questions : premièrement, l’applica-
tion des principes contractuels et, deuxièmement, les lacunes du Règlement de 2002 relatif au
commerce électronique (la directive CE). L’article fait les observations suivantes : (a) dans la mesure où
les règles relatives à la formation du contrat sont pertinentes, elles constituent un premier pas et non le
point final de la compréhension; (b) eu égard au rôle clé joué par les ordinateurs dans la structuration
et le traitement des communications, il est essentiel de reconnaître les valeurs sous-jacentes de l’infra-
structure technologique; et (c) l’exposé des valeurs qui sous-tendent l’infrastructure technologique offre
une meilleure avenue pour la compréhension de la formation des contrats en ligne. Le principe des
couches, suggère l’article, offre un bon moyen de réconcilier la doctrine des contrats avec le rôle cen-
tral du Règlement. En conclusion, l’article suggère que les efforts faits afin de comprendre les défis de
la gouvernance en matière de la formation des contrats en ligne au moyen de règles juridiques sont mal
orientés. Afin de saisir le rôle contemporain des contrats, il faut intégrer à son analyse la compréhen-
sion de ce qui dans le matériel et les logiciels des systèmes de communication donnent à l’engagement
un caractère obligatoire.
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I. INTRODUCTION
IF ONE MENTIONS online contract formation, the intuitive response of many indi-
viduals would be to turn to the legal concepts of offer, acceptance and consid-
eration.1 The interpretive community, which subscribes to this linear approach to
problem solving, is unlikely to be convinced that the distinctive features of the
virtual environment introduce an additional dimension into the way in which we
can now think about contract doctrine and its role.2 Their resistance to reconcil-
ing doctrine with technology may be attributed to a perception that the coher-
ence and rationality of contract rules and norms provide objective benchmarks
for determining the legitimacy of the doctrine.3 Another reason for the scepti-
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1. Examples of the linear approach to the conceptualization of online contract formation include: Chris Reed,
Internet Law: Text and Materials (London: Butterworths, 2000); Graham J.H. Smith, Internet Law and
Regulation, 3rd ed. (London: Sweet & Maxwell, 2002) at 449–59; Saravuth Pitiyasak, “Electronic Contracts:
Contract Law of Thailand, England and UNCITRAL Compared” (2003) 9:1 Computer and
Telecommunications Law Review 16; Christina Hultmark Ramberg, “The ECommerce Directive and
Contract Formation in a Comparative Perspective” (2001) 26 Eur. L. Rev. 429; Simon Jones, “Forming
Electronic Contracts in the United Kingdom” (2000) 11 Int’l Co. & Com. L. Rev. 301; Diane Rowland &
Elizabeth Macdonald, Information Technology Law, 2d ed. (London: Cavendish, 2000) at 295-306; Andrew
D. Murray, “Entering into Contracts Electronically: The Real W.W.W.” in Lillian Edwards & Charlotte Waelde
eds., Law & the Internet 2d ed. (Oxford: Hart, 2000) 17. See, however, the critical stance put forward in the
following literature with regard to the conceptualization of legal rules: Oliver Wendell Holmes, “The Path
of Law” (1896–97) 10 Harv. L. Rev. 461, reprinted in (1996–97) 110 Harv. L. Rev. 991; P.S. Atiyah, The Rise
and Fall of Freedom of Contract (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1979); P.S. Atiyah, Essays on Contract (Oxford:
Clarendon Press, 1986); Michael Furmston ed., The Law of Contract (London: Butterworths, 1999); Hugh
Collins, The Law of Contract, 3rd ed. (London: Butterworths, 1997); Roger Brownsword, Contract Law,
Themes for the Twenty-First Century (London: Butterworths, 2000).
2. See, generally, on the limits of formalism: Owen M. Fiss, “Objectivity and Interpretation” (1982) 34 Stan. L.
Rev. 739; William Twining & David Meirs, How to do Things With Rules, 2nd ed. (London: Weidenfeld &
Nicholson, 1982); John Bell, Policy Arguments in Judicial Decisions (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1983);
Jay M. Feinman, “Critical Approaches to Contract Law” (1983) 30 UCLA L. Rev. 829; David Sugarman &
G.R. Rubin, “Towards a New History of Law and Material Society in England, 1750–1914” in G.R. Rubin &
D. Sugarman eds., Law, Economy and Society: Essays in the History of English Law, 1750–1914 (Abingdon:
Professional Books, 1984); D. Sugarman, “Legal Theory, the Common Law Mind and the Making of the
Textbook Tradition” in W. Twining ed., Legal Theory and Common Law (Oxford: Basil Blackwell, 1986) 26;
Brian Simpson, “The Common Law and Legal Theory” in W. Twining ed., ibid. at 8.
3. See Sugarman, “Legal Theory” ibid. at 26-28, 48-53 and Simpson, “The Common Law” ibid. at 10–18. See
Edward H. Levi, An Introduction to Legal Reasoning (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1948) at 27–32.
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cism about the significance of internet methods of communications for the mean-
ings we ascribe to the ideas of consent and agreement may be that doctrine is
regarded primarily as a regime of rules, providing solutions to practical problems. 
Whatever the reasons, the outcome is clear. The pattern of analysis is
directed towards resolving two key issues: first, the universality of contract prin-
ciples and, second, the significance of the Electronic Commerce (EC Directive)
Regulations 2002 for orthodox contract doctrine. The paper will demonstrate the
following: (a) that, to the extent that the rules on contract formation are relevant,
they provide a preliminary and not the final point of understanding; (b) that the
dominant role of computers in structuring and processing communications makes
it critical to identify the values embedded in the technological infrastructure; and
(c) that the narrative encapsulated in the layer principle provides a better route to
understanding online contract formation. Illustrations will be provided to support
the hypothesis. The layer principle, it is suggested, provides an appropriate basis
for reconciling contract doctrine with the central role of Electronic Commerce (EC
Directive) Regulations 2002. The paper concludes that attempts to understand
the governance challenges for online contract formation through legal rules are
misplaced. In order to understand the contemporary role of contract we need to
integrate the communications systems of hardware and software into our concept
of what it is that gives commitments their binding character.
*
2. THE NARRATIVE OF BINDING COMMITMENT: A CRITIQUE
2.1. Background
CONTRACT HAS LONG PROVIDED the backbone of commercial activity. It is not dif-
ficult to understand the reasons for this: 
[O]ne of the functions of the law of contract is to discriminate between those
transactions that are enforceable as contracts and those that are not. Doctrine
lays down the constituents of a contract (agreement, consideration, certainty,
intention and, in exceptional cases, written formality)…. However, for the
most part, lawyers will expect to recognise a “contract,” as specified by the
law of contract, when they see one.4
There is consensus among some commentators that, when thinking
about online contract formation, we need not distinguish between the process-
es of constituting legal relations through online and offline contracts.5 If the claim
is intended to do nothing more than to assert that the principles and rules of con-
tract are universal, there is unlikely to be much dissent. In this narrow sense, we
can understand Reed as restating what is uncontroversial: 
4. Brownsword, supra note 1 at 1.
5. See literature in supra note 1.
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The basic principles of contract formation are still the same, however, so that
the existence of a contract and its terms are discovered by identifying the
communications which pass between the parties, identifying the offer, and
then determining whether that offer has been accepted.6
It cannot be seriously argued that different contract principles should
apply to an online purchase of a book from amazon.co.uk as opposed to a pur-
chase from a traditional bookstore.7 Reed’s observation underscores the disposi-
tion of members of the interpretive community to frame online governance
challenges through the linear narrative of doctrine based on jurisprudence.
Indeed, his account of the governance challenges affirms the tradition of com-
mon lawyers to reach instinctively for the rules of contract formation. The refer-
ence to the “online” and “offline” contracts as being distinctions without a
difference has another troubling aspect: those who adopt the strict, rule-orient-
ed view of online contract governance can be seen as rejecting the thesis that
software and hardware ought to be incorporated into the narrative of the regu-
lations and institutions of control. The thesis is characterized as a form of “cyber-
space fallacy,” a phrase that attempts to signal a cautious approach to treating
online contracts as meriting special attention. Consider, for example, the follow-
ing observation: 
The Cyberspace fallacy states that the Internet is a new jurisdiction, in which
none of the existing rules and regulations apply. This jurisdiction has no phys-
ical existence; it is a virtual space which expands and contracts as the differ-
ent networks and computers, which collectively make up the Internet, connect
to and disconnect from each other… A moment’s thought reveals the fallacy.
All the actors involved in an Internet transaction have a real-world existence,
and are located in one or more legal jurisdictions… It is inconceivable that a
real-world jurisdiction would deny that its laws potentially applied to the
transaction.8
This observation—whatever the cybertheorists may or may not have
said—is as interesting as the line of analysis about the interaction between con-
tract doctrine and the communications system: 
[the Internet] is fundamentally no more than a means of communication, and
that the new issues of Internet law arise from the differences between Internet
and physical world communication methods, particularly communicating via
intermediaries…. [T]he contracts themselves are not fundamentally different.
What is different is the method by which those contracts are formed, using
indirect communications via packet switching hosts.9
6. Reed, supra note 1 at 175.
7. By this I mean that binding commitments share a range of core values, which the rules on contract forma-
tion mirror. See Brownsword, supra note 1.
8. Reed, supra note 1 at 1-2. Contrast this account with a more nuanced attitude towards online contract for-
mation: Margaret Jane Radin, “Online Standardization and the Integration of Text and Machine” (2002) 70
Fordham L. Rev. 1125 and Margaret Jane Radin, “Humans, Computers and Binding Commitment” (2000)
75 Ind. L.J. 1125, <http://www.law.indiana.edu/ilj/v75/no4/radin.pdf>. 
9. Reed, supra note 1 at 174–75.
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The core analysis of the paper will attempt to assess whether this char-
acterization stands up to scrutiny. Lawyers should be interested in the communi-
cations system and its significance for the meanings we ascribe to concepts like
“agreement” for a variety of reasons. First, the communications system now pro-
vides a new dynamic forum for social and economic relations.10 Second, an
understanding of architecture and design values in software and hardware will
help assess the coming of age of the institution of contract in the information
age; in particular, we can begin to reflect on the normative values that now
define the legitimacy of the private ordering regime.11 Third, the new dynamics
of the online environment will provide a context for evaluating the issue of
whether the prescriptions under the Electronic Commerce (EC Directive)
Regulations 2002 require a reorientation of the way we tend to conceive binding
commitments. We can deal with each of the reasons through a case study.
2.2. Case Study
Consider for example a company (“A”), which owns a web site in the UK.12 “A”
places an advertisement on its website offering 100 high-performance laptops.
Each laptop is priced at £299. This is a pricing error. The price should have been
£2999. The advertisement contains a statement saying that the offer is available
only during the period of October 1 to November 1. “B” comes across this
advertisement while surfing on the internet. “B” orders 10 laptops and com-
pletes the required web form. It is customary for “A” to include a copy of its stan-
dard terms and conditions with the goods. The web page also has an electronic
version of the standard terms and conditions. Consumers making a purchase are
required to click a button on the web page to signify their assent to the terms
and conditions. If a consumer does not wish to accept the terms, then the trans-
action will not be processed. The two-page agreement can be viewed by scroll-
ing with a function button on the screen. 
“B” scrolls through part of the agreement and decides to click on the
button executing the agreement. “B” also sends “A” an email confirming that he
wishes to accept the offer and to place an order for 10 laptops. Among other
things, the terms and conditions stipulate, first, that the offer is available while
stocks last and, second, that each customer is limited to the purchase of one lap-
top and, third, that the company will not be bound to supply goods that are
priced incorrectly. After clicking on the order button, “B” receives an automatic
reply from “A” indicating that the order has been received and that the goods
will be shipped by the end of the month. One day later, the company discovers
the pricing error. “A” takes steps to amend the advertisement. Customers who
10. See Mark Poster, The PostModern Virtualities: The Second Media Age (Oxford: Blackwell, 1995), chapter 2;
Jean Baudrillard, “Simulacra and Simulations” in Mark Poster ed., Jean Baudrillard, Selected Writings
(Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1988) 166; J. Baal-Schem & D. Shinar, “The Telepresence Era: Global
Village Or Media Slums” (Spring 1998) 17:1 IEEE Technology and Society Magazine 28, <http://ieeex-
plore.ieee.org/xpl/abs_free.jsp?arNumber=663854>; “Martin Jacques Interviews Professor Stuart Hall,
Open University” [n.d.] University of Sydney, <http://www.usyd.edu.au/su/social/papers/hall1.html>.
11. See e.g. the attempts by the Motion Picture Association of America (MPAA) to lobby the US government
to require computer-hardware manufacturers to include copy-protection schemes, as explained in Farhad
Manjoo, “Hollywood to the Computer Industry: We don’t Need no Stinking Napsters!” Salon.com
(October 27, 2003), <http://www.salon.com/tech/feature/2003/10/27/broadcast_flag/index_np.html>. 
110 university of ottawa law & technology journal www.uoltj.ca
 
made the booking based on the original price are sent emails and letters to their
respective web-mail accounts and home addresses notifying them of this error.
“B” is informed by email that the company deeply regrets the inconvenience
caused by the error. The email also states that only one laptop will be available
but at the price of £2900. To take advantage of this special discount, “B” is
required to confirm the order within 48 hours. 
2.3. Binding Commitment: A Linear Analysis
Commentators who define issues of online contract formation like agreement and
consent rely exclusively on the vocabulary of existing doctrine. The communica-
tions system is seen as having no doctrinal significance as it appears to be noth-
ing more than a passive communications system or a sophisticated telephone.
When explaining the governance challenges raised by this new form of remote
contracting, the decision to focus the discourse on specific categories of doctrine
is underpinned by two premises. First, it is asserted that blending the virtual and
the real worlds may overcomplicate the rational foundations of contract law: 
The Internet, though, does raise unique technological issues when examining
contract formation. It is these technological issues which all too often cloud
our analysis of the contract.13
Second, it is claimed that the internet does not alter the fundamental
character of a contract. For example, when alluding to the governance chal-
lenges posed for contract law, Reed makes this observation: 
When we add to this the fact that a seller may not be communicating direct-
ly with the customer but instead form part of a virtual marketplace or Internet
shopping mall, and that the customer may not be making purchasing deci-
sions directly but acting through an automated agent, it becomes obvious
that the process of contract formation is not so straightforward as in the phys-
ical world.14
These observations place the focal point for resolving questions regard-
ing the constitution of contractual relations squarely within the boundaries of
contract doctrine. More importantly, the authors intend to prescribe the primacy
of the linear narrative of doctrine in explaining online contract formation. For
example, the task of the lawyer is defined in terms of rule identification and
application; the narrative of contract doctrine is seen as being comprehensive.
The logic and coherence of the rules create the illusion that the governance
12. See also Peter Howitt, “Contracts: The Perils of Online Pricing” (2003) 5:4 E-Commerce Law & Policy 2 (this
article provides an outline of the proactive self-help contractual devices that online retailers can adopt in
order to avoid online pricing errors); The Unfair Terms in Consumer Contracts Regulations 1999, S.I.
1999/2083, <http://www.legislation.hmso.gov.uk/si/si1999/19992083.htm> [Unfair Terms Regulations
1999]; Amanda C. Brock, “Amazon and Pricing” (2003) Electronic Business Law, LexisNexis 5(5) at 16
(regarding pricing error in iPaq PDAs), <http://www.juriscom.net/pro/visu.php?ID=276>.
13. Murray, supra note 1 at 18.
14. Reed, supra note 1 at 175. The distinction between the physical world and the online environment seems at
odds with the frequent assertion of engaging in cyberspace fallacy. If the distinction between the “real” and
“cyber” worlds is questionable then the use of the distinction here could be subject to similar scepticism.
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issues do not require anything beyond the identification and application of
established rules and principles. 
We can provide a brief illustration of what is entailed by the linear
process of conflict resolution. For example, a web advertisement becomes char-
acterized as being either an “offer” or an “acceptance.” The ruling in Carlill v.
Carbolic Smoke Ball is regarded as providing a relevant case analogy.15 An adver-
tisement is capable of binding a web host to a potentially wide audience, if the
prerequisites of acceptance and reliance are met. In addition to the use of anal-
ogy, the lawyer relies on reasoned argument. If “A” contests this characterization
of the advertisement, it will have to argue that the online advertisement is an
expression that attempts to invite offers. In addition to precedents like
Pharmaceutical Society of Great Britain v. Boots Cash Chemists, “A” may wish to
limit the scope of Carlill by introducing public-policy arguments—of unlimited
liability to unlimited members of the web community—to persuade the court
that it would be unreasonable to subject companies like “A” to a rule that
evolved from an entirely different set of social and technological conditions.16
“B” can neutralize this argument by pointing to the specificity of the
advertisement—the numbers of laptops available and the duration of the offer.17
The online contract cannot be binding on the parties until there has been an
agreement. The idea that an agreement is the product of a consensual under-
taking is reflected in the rule, which requires the offer to be accepted; the corol-
lary here is that a binding commitment emerges when the offeror has knowledge
of the acceptance and when the offeree is similarly apprised of this. The reliance
on reasoned argument leads one to conclude that the universal reach of contract
rules and principles cannot be questioned. 
Returning to the hypothetical, the resolution of the problem will depend
on whether “B” has consented to the terms of the agreement. Similarities are
likely to be identified between the online and offline contexts for contractual
relations. The use of analogy and reasoning becomes critical to the process by
which a solution is now provided. Lawyers may point to the absence of a meet-
ing of minds since “B” had not read the entire agreement and understood its
contractual importance. Precedent in the form of Thornton v. Shoe Lane Parking
could be called to assist the claims of “B.”18 “B” could also take advantage of the
Unfair Terms Regulations 1999.19
Over the course of the arguments some reference is likely to be made
to two important legal rules. For example, in the online environment the decision
in Adams v. Lindsell is seen as being authority for the proposition that an agree-
15. (1892), [1893] 1 Q.B. 256 (CA) [Carlill].
16. [1953] 1 Q.B. 401 (CA) [Boots].
17. For example, the courts have shown a willingness to take into account prevailing commercial practices and
the reasonableness of the reliance when determining the question of whether a particular representation is
sufficient to amount to an offer.
18. (1970), [1971] 2 Q.B. 163 (CA) [Thornton].
19. See supra note 13. Section 5(1) reads: “A contractual term which has not been individually negotiated shall
be regarded as unfair if, contrary to the requirement of good faith, it causes a significant imbalance in the
parties’ rights and obligations arising under the contract, to the detriment of the consumer.” A consumer
may now be capable of subjecting the online retailer on the grounds of unfairness, leading to the latter
having to discharge the legal and evidentiary burden of good faith.
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ment can be constituted even in cases where the offeror has no knowledge of
the acceptance.20 Under this rule, a contract is formally constituted when the let-
ter is posted and not when the offeror’s attention is drawn to the contents of the
letter. Parties can “opt out” of the operation of the rule should they wish to do
so, as can be seen from cases like Henthorn v. Fraser21 and Holwell Securities Ltd.
v. Hughes.22 The postal rule does not apply where remote contracting takes
place through instantaneous communications. Again, we can see how analogy
and rule identification assist in the process of problem solving. For example, the
rule in Brinkibon and Entores provides an alternative route to problem solving.23
A contract is concluded when both parties are apprised of the other’s intentions
with regard to putative legal relations.24
The aim of this illustration is to outline the approach that is frequently
used to map the basis upon which binding commitments are constituted in the
online environment. The familiar refrain “old wine in new bottles” may apply
here. A number of commentators who give attention to the governance chal-
lenges for contract law in the online environment seem content to limit their
analysis in terms of its linear rules. To be sure, contract doctrine is viewed as a
regime of rules, with accessible discourse, specific categories and precedents.
This view of contract doctrine provides the method for describing and analyzing
the issue of online binding commitments. Ultimately, the linear character of the
rule-oriented approach leads to online relations between “A” and “B” being for-
mulated in the following terms: the identities of the offerors and offerees;
whether the advertisement can be characterized as an “offer”; whether the offer
has been “accepted”; and whether a “mistake” is sufficient to prevent reliance
by the offeree at the expense of the offeror. 
Within this context, the online methods of communications become pas-
sive conduits. Adherence to lawyer’s law provides a look and feel about the
rationality and legitimacy of the foundations for characterizing commitments as
being legal and enforceable. Technology is not seen as exacerbating the tensions
that already lie embedded within the doctrine. As the later discussion of the
technological infrastructure and the account of the complex dimensions of con-
tract law will demonstrate, the primacy given to the linear narrative in explaining
online contract formation cannot go unquestioned. This is not to suggest that
the validity of the approach is flawed or erroneous. Rather, the problem with
adhering closely to the rule-oriented approach is that the analysis does not
extend beyond rule identification and application. The premise that informs this
approach is that technology and the communications system can be viewed as
method; the context in which relations are constituted is marginalized and is
regarded as having no bearing on our understanding of the doctrine. 
20. (1818), 1 B. & Ald. 681, (1818), 106 E.R. 250 (KB) [Adams cited to B. & Ald.].
21. [1892] 2 Ch. 27 (CA) [Henthorn]. 
22. (1973), [1974] 1 All E.R. 161 (CA) [Holwell].
23. Brinkibon Ltd. v. Stahag Stahl (1982), [1983] 2 A.C. 34 (HL) [Brinkibon]; Entores Ltd. v. Miles Far East Corp.,
[1955] 2 Q.B. 327 (CA) [Entores].
24. For example, it makes it possible for lawyers to state with confidence that sending emails and clicking on
an order form do not disrupt the traditional paradigm of contract formation. But see Pretty Pictures v.
Quixote Films Ltd., [2003] EWHC 311 (Transcript: Smith Bernal) (QB) [Pretty Pictures]. 
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This premise and the accompanying characterization are misconceived.
As will be argued later, we cannot begin to think about the role of contract in for-
mulating rules for identifying and enforcing binding commitments without
acknowledging the impact of complex background forces like technological, cul-
tural and political values, and economics.25
2.4. Some Unanswered Questions
A preliminary observation can be made with regard to the emphasis placed by
commentators on the issue of whether contract principles can be applied to
online contracting. This is essentially an exercise that offers little in terms of new
insights. A contract does not cease to have the fundamental components by the
mere fact that an agreement is concluded online. In fact, Sommer—a cyber-scep-
tic—has provided a damning indictment of those who seek to cast doubt on the
universal reach of contract principles:
In contract formation, UETA [Uniform Electronic Transactions Act] presents only
one new issue—contracting with machines that have something resembling
discretion. People have long been forming contracts with vending machines.
Courts have not been fazed by such contracts, probably because they have
closely resembled ordinary ‘take-it-or leave-it’ consumer contracts.26
One criticism of the rule-oriented approach is that discussions on whether con-
tract principles apply to the online environment distract us from the real gover-
nance challenges that contract formation in the online environment seems to
pose—those being how and why technology affects the traditional dynamics of
contract relations and its significance for the meanings we ascribe to concepts like
consent and agreement. It is worth recalling that traditional ideas of contract doc-
trine view consent as the product of autonomy and choices resulting from human
interactions. Is this presumption valid where the entity concerned is software?
There is, for example, a clear need to begin thinking about the normative mean-
ing of agreement or consent in light of a consumer like “B” failing to appreciate
the legal significance of clicking on the computer mouse. The policy arguments in
favour of a doctrine of caveat emptor need to be reconciled with the contempo-
rary emphasis on “good faith” in dealings with consumers. How do we define an
agreement where retailers possess the technology to structure and process com-
munications? How is agreement to be regarded as having been manifested? 
The second criticism is that explanations suggesting that technology is
passive are not accompanied by any plausible argument as to why it is that com-
munications systems should be characterized as method.27 “Old wine in new bot-
25. Marshall McLuhan, The Gutenberg Galaxy (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1962) at 23-31. See gener-
ally Manuel Castells, The Information Age: Economy, Society and Culture (Oxford: Blackwell,1996) and
Frank Webster, Theories of the Information Society, 2d ed. (London: Routledge, 2002).
26. Joseph H. Sommer, “Against Cyberlaw” (2000) 15 Berkeley Tech L. J. 1145 at 1177.
27. See e.g. Sommer, supra note 26. The author argues that the governance issues raised by technology are not
new or difficult because legal concepts and rules have flexibility embedded in their institutions. This, it
should be noted, is not the claim made in this paper. I do not suggest that we need a law of cyberspace,
but rather that we need to understand ex ante technology and its design values so that we can articulate
the responses of law. This is a separate argument and should not be conflated with the other premise, which
is contestable—that is, that traditional laws are ill-equipped to deal with the issues raised by online activity.
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tles” is already an overburdened metaphor.28 Its use in this context tends to mis-
lead since it reduces the complexities of online contracting to a requirement for
us to do nothing more than identify and apply the legal rules. 
Third, at a deeper level, the overemphasis on the idea of contract as
rules leaves unexplored an aspect of contractual relations in the online environ-
ment—the legitimacy of the rules that enable law to enforce binding commit-
ments. The institution of contract is founded on liberal ideals about private
ordering and property ownership.29 A contract is held out as a device, which cap-
tures these ideals. Contract rules and norms are viewed as mirroring the liberal
ideals of a democratic society and the discipline imposed by the market. The
scepticism regarding the restrictive structures of feudal society was supplanted
by the acceptance that market norms and values provide a legitimate and trans-
parent standard for ordering social and economic relations.30 Contemporary
accounts of contract provide a nuanced description of the way that norms and
values like good faith and reasonableness can facilitate the process by which law
attempts to legitimate binding agreements. Brownsword captures the short-
comings of a rule-oriented approach: 
[W]hilst we might hope to construct a definition of a “contract” around the
shared idea of an enforceable transaction, there is little agreement about how
this is best articulated. Some definitions might centre on the idea of an
enforceable agreement; others might be anchored to the concept of an
enforceable promise (or set of promises); and others might emphasise that
contracts are essentially exchanges, or perhaps bargained-for exchanges…. In
practice, it might be thought, it cannot matter whether a contract is con-
ceived of in terms of promise, agreement, bargain, or whatever…. On occa-
sion, however, the way in which we conceive of a contract does have a
practical bearing.31
Fourth, the present commentaries are noticeably silent with regard to
the meaning to be ascribed to consent and its relevance in the light of the
Electronic Commerce (EC Directive) Regulations 2002. Indeed, these regulations
seem to acknowledge the primacy of the values typically regarded as being at
the core of binding commitments in an environment where technology vests in
retailers control over the process of structuring communications. Online contract
formation potentially raises issues that fall into the no-man’s land of reciprocity.
The rules on offer and acceptance reflect cultural, economic and political ideas
about consensual activity. According to contract law promises become binding
when there is a meeting of minds; the reciprocal exchange of promises with con-
sideration is deemed to bind the parties when an offer is accepted. How can we
28. See Jonathan H. Blavin & I. Glenn Cohen, “Gore, Gibson, and Goldsmith: The Evolution of Internet
Metaphors in Law and Commentary” (2002) 16 Harv. J.L. & Tech. 265, <http:jolt.law.harvard.edu/articles/
pdf/v16/16HarvJLTech265.pdf>.
29. Historians have long grappled with questions revolving around the way that society and institutions of
ordering have been constructed and legitimated. See W.W. Buckland, A.D. McNair & F.H. Lawson, Roman
Law and Common Law: A Comparison in Outline, 2d ed. (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1952)
and B. Simpson, “Innovation in Nineteenth Century Contract Law” (1975) 91 Law Q. Rev. 247.
30. H. Collins, “Contract and Legal Theory” in Twining ed., Legal Theory, supra note 2, 136 at 137–39. 
31. See Brownsword, supra note 1 at 1–2.
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prescribe regulations which best reconcile the methods of contracting with the
underlying values and assumptions about the legitimacy of doctrine? 
Fifth, the debates on online contract formation do not provide a bridge
between doctrine and the Electronic Commerce (EC Directive) Regulations 2002.
This is a significant shortcoming. Two reasons may be provided as to why we can-
not continue to perpetuate this status quo. Firstly, the enactment of these regu-
lations reflects the growing domestic and international consensus among
policymakers and industry that traditional ideas like agreement, autonomy and
consent cannot remain unaffected by the increasing interaction between tech-
nology, law and society.32 Emerging case law from the United States and Canada
suggests that questions of legitimacy and of the vulnerabilities of consumers are
not far from judicial thinking about the growing prominence of technology and
computer software in structuring and processing online communications.33
Secondly, the predecessor—the Electronic Commerce Directive which the
Directive of 2002 largely implements—has been seen as being out of step with
orthodox principles of contract law and as not providing a response to the chal-
lenges of online contracting. 
This is not true. Murray, for example, regards the reach of the Directive
as falling short of what was expected.34 What troubles him is the absence of a
definition as to the precise point in time at which a contract is formally consti-
tuted. Its prescription, he suggests, is “an unsatisfactory solution” to the chal-
lenges posed by the online contracting environment.35 The Directive: 
…says remarkably little on contract formation. It provides duties for those who
market their products over the Internet, but makes no attempt to define the
legal position of an electronic offer or acceptance. In addition the Directive is
of limited effect when dealing with contracts concluded exclusively by e-mail
due to several exceptions which apply to e-mail communications.36
Lloyd is puzzled by the fact that the new matrix provided by the regula-
tions may not fit into the orthodox narrative of contract since it: 
…would pose problems for the UK system which…sees offers emanating from
the customer rather than the supplier. There appears also to be an element of
unnecessary complication by adding the requirement of acknowledgment of
receipt of acceptance as a condition for the conclusion of a contract.37
Others have noted pointedly that the regulatory framework now in place: 
…prove[s] to be extremely disappointing to those who read it with a hope of
obtaining guidance on the formation of contract within the European Union….
it provides no more than equivalence at the point of formation of a contract.38
32. See UNCTAD, E-Commerce and Development Report 2003, UNCTAD/SIDTE/ECB/2003/1 (November
2003). 
33. See discussion in Part 4.
34. Murray, supra note 1 at 28.
35. Ibid.
36. Ibid.
37. I. Lloyd, Legal Aspects of the Information Society (London: Butterworths, 2000) at 243.
38. Murray, supra note 1 at 28.
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In the light of these apparent deficiencies it has been suggested that: 
“[I]t is perhaps time the postal rule was restated for the twenty-first century.
A possible reformulation would focus on the non-instantaneous nature of
communications which benefit from the rule.”39
One proposed solution is that “where an offer contemplates acceptance
by a non-immediate form of communication, that acceptance is effective from
the time it leaves the acceptor’s control.”40 This proposal underlines the prob-
lems faced by contract fundamentalists when attempting to construct an intelli-
gible response to the new vernacular of binding commitments in the online
environment. 
There is an easier way of grappling with the governance issues facing
contract doctrine. We can simply redirect the focus of the inquiry without sacri-
ficing the rationality of doctrine and ask how the communications system pow-
ered by the internet alters the dynamics of social and economic relations and
whether the normative values used to uphold the legitimacy of the institution of
contract are undermined by this technology. Furthermore, we can ask what doc-
trinal arguments must now be offered when evaluating the Electronic Commerce
(EC Directive) Regulations 2002. 
As businesses and individuals become reliant on new methods of infor-
mation processing and transmission, it is contended that contract doctrine and
the way we conceive binding commitments cannot remain insulated.41 Indeed, to
insist on the artificial distinction of method and process merely delays the inte-
gration of the technological challenges into a coherent theoretical framework. It
is in this sense that one can take issue with Reed’s earlier observation that online
and offline contracting environments are distinctions without a difference. There
is a difference between the ideal of consent as a value upheld by contract rules
on the one hand and mediated consent in the online environment which results
from the values embedded in the programs of computer software and hardware
on the other. Continued reluctance to confront the challenges posed by tech-
nology may not be an option since policymakers and judges have already rec-
ognized the need to accommodate this new phenomenon in the context of
binding commitments. 
Sixth, notwithstanding the discernible benefits of contract rules, aca-
demics reflecting on the governance challenges of contracting in the online envi-
ronment seem not to be troubled by the fact that the methodology adopted has
little affinity with the technological infrastructure and computer software.42 The
method-process distinction reflects a fundamental difference in perception
39. Ibid. at 26.
40. Ibid.
41. See EC, Commission, “The Impact of the E-Economy on European Enterprises: Economic Analysis and
Policy Implications,” Communication from the Commission to the Council and the European Parliament
(Brussels: EC, 2001) (COM (2001), 711 final), <http://europa.eu.int/comm/enterprise/ict/policy/doc/
com_2001_711_en.pdf>. See also EC Commission, E-Commerce in Europe: Results of the Pilot Surveys
Carried Out in 2001 (pilot survey carried out by Eurostat, July 2002), <http://europa.eu.int/comm/
enterprise/ict/studies/lr-e-comm-in-eur-2001.pdf> [EC Pilot Survey].
42. The irony of this view is that online contract formation is seen in terms of abstract concepts because they
do not acknowledge the importance of context to the way that the rules are conceptualized ex ante.
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about the way online relations and methods of communications are character-
ized: virtual reality versus real-world reality. The interpretive community would
have us believe that there is only view of online contract relations—the topogra-
phy mapped by the institution of contract and the methods of communication a
passive receptor. In contrast, however, another perspective can be offered. Kerr,
for example, has attempted to characterize the virtual-reality matrix in organic
terms.43 He uses the science-fiction thriller The Matrix to identify the significance
of the experience of internet users for the way reality is viewed: 
The Matrix points to an important problem that arises when we try to under-
stand the nature of computer networks in general and the internet in particu-
lar…. [W]e can think about the Internet in two ways, virtual and real. The virtual
perspective…accepts the virtual world of cyberspace as akin to reality…. But
as we try to make sense of what the Internet is, to understand what we expe-
rience online, we might decide to treat that virtual world as if it were real.44
Those who regard the substance of contract law as being amenable to
orthodox “real-world” principles and analogies may be inclined to dismiss this
characterization without any argument as to why that is likely to be the case. It
has, for example, been suggested that the characterization of technology as
method rather than process is the logical result of the fact that: 
…the Internet is fundamentally no more than a means of communication, and
that the new issues of Internet law arise from the differences between Internet
and physical world of communications methods, particularly communicating
via intermediaries.45
Consequently, when thinking about governance in the online environ-
ment, we must avoid segregating our ideas about legal constitution of econom-
ic and social relations in terms of “virtual” and “real” worlds. This view of the
rule-oriented model in the online environment has an air of inevitability about its
primacy and value. The cognate here is that it would be irrational—almost illog-
ical—to reify technology since contract rules can provide the right answers to the
problems of online contracting. 
We should recall that this line of reasoning can be traced back to the
characterization of the online and offline worlds as being distinctions without a
difference. Does this mean that those who call for a reassessment as to the way
the design space of the internet now attempts to define the legitimacy of the
market order are mistaken? To be sure, commentators like Lessig, Benkler and
Boyle have consistently argued that the online environment poses governance
43. Orin S Kerr, “The Problem of Perspective in Internet Law” (2003) 91 Geo. L.J. 357,
<http://ssrn.com/abstract=310020>.
44. Ibid. at 359.
45. Reed, supra note 1 at 174.
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challenges, which require a nuanced view of regulability.46 Lessig, for example,
goes to great lengths to impress upon policymakers the significance of under-
standing the effect of design values embedded in the architecture of computer
software and the internet, in particular, on the legitimacy of our governance insti-
tutions as nodes of control.47 We are, in short, concerned with the values that
underpin the rules of ordering and their legitimacy in the online environment.
The insights offered by Lessig in this respect are not novel to the way critical legal
scholars have viewed the institution of contract. A long-term critic of contract
fundamentalism makes the following observation: 
Until we have resolved our uncertainties about what values these modern legal
developments represent…it is…therefore helpful to return to some first princi-
ples of political and moral philosophy…. [W]e can best understand the form of
modern doctrines by situating them in a broader dialogue within liberal politi-
cal philosophy concerning the relation between the citizen and the state.48
These concerns can be referred back to the simple idea about binding
commitments in the law of contract: they cannot take place until parties engage
in some kind of interaction. In the online environment, this process cannot take
place without the aid of hardware and software. The communications system that
the hardware and software help to create can be seen as part of the process by
which legal relations are constituted. The governance challenge for contract law
is not so much a question of whether its rules apply in the online environment.
The real question—one that contract fundamentalists seem to marginalize—is
whether the design space of the internet now modifies traditional ideas of auton-
omy, choice and agreement. 
It is the concern about design space being structured by the values of
the programmers that forms the core of the “code-is-law” thesis articulated by
Larry Lessig in Code and The Future of Ideas.49 The flaw in the characterization
of the communications system as method and not process is that the process by
which agreements are constituted in the communications system conflicts with
the issue concerning the application of contract rules in the online environment.
Seventh, the rule-oriented approach, with its emphasis on legal charac-
terization of relevant facts, attaches little significance to context as a driving
force for defining and shaping the institution of contract. As Brownsword
observes, we cannot talk sensibly about the substance of contract law if we
ignore the constraints imposed by law on the autonomy of individuals by cultur-
al, political and economic values on the one hand and the institutions and instru-
ments that we construct on the other.50 Two observations can be made. The first
46. Lawrence Lessig, Code and Other Laws of Cyberspace (New York: Basic Books, 1999) [Code]; Lawrence
Lessig, The Future of Ideas: The Fate of the Commons in a Connected World (New York: Random House,
2001) [The Future of Ideas]; Yochai Benkler, “From Consumers to Users: Shifting the Deeper Structures of
Regulation” (2000) 52 Fed. Comm. L.J. 561, <http://www.law.indiana.edu/fclj/pubs/v52/no3/benkler1.pdf>;
James Boyle, “A Politics of Intellectual Property: Environmentalism for the Net?” (1997) 47 Duke L.J. 187,
http://<http:www.law.duke.edu/shell/cite.pl?47+Duke+L.+J.+87>.
47. See Part 4 for a fuller analysis.
48. Collins, supra note 2 at 137.
49. Lessig, supra note 46.
50. Brownsword, supra note 1 at 1.
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is that contract law does not operate in a technological and societal vacuum.51
This is not a radical observation and the fact that it eludes those who seem intent
on using doctrine to separate the substance of the rules from its context remains
a puzzle. For example, it has been pointed out that technological innovation in
the contemporary environment is increasingly confronting communities, policy-
makers and industry with difficult questions.52 In the space of a decade, the
deterministic nature of technological rules in the area of cloning, genetic screen-
ing, biometrics, surrogacy, digital music and surveillance has resulted in policy-
makers, judges and communities re-examining the ramifications of the latent
ambiguity of their values for legal institutions and societies.53 The resulting ten-
sions challenge the ability of policymakers and judges as they attempt to use the
institutions of law and its instruments to establish regulatory frameworks. The law
of contract has not been insulated from the diverse background conditions.
Indeed, the curtailment of the privity doctrine, the re-examination of the doctrine
of consideration and the introduction of obligations of good faith suggest the
benefits of drawing on the wider background when explaining the shifts in the
governance of contractual relationships. 
With regard to the second observation, Kerr’s emphasis on perspective
is relevant. The perspectives—virtual and real—are suggestive of two ways of
characterizing the way that we view relations and institutions in society, these
being both offline and online. By asserting the unassailable nature of the claim
that the virtual technological infrastructure is method, the interpretive communi-
ty perhaps brushes aside too readily the point that the idea of what constitutes
“facts” can be contested. Facts, as Fish reminds us, do not have an objective
meaning in themselves.54 It cannot be seriously argued that the rules of contract
and of relations between parties take on a meaning independent of their
observers. Take, for example, the traditional narrative of lawyers applying the law
to the facts. At first blush it might appear that the facts as constituted through
information gathered from documents and interviews of witnesses are objective
and independent. This is both a gross simplification and a misconception of the
process of characterization and of what we assume as being objective reality. As
John Casti correctly observes: 
51. Andrew Feenberg, Critical Theory of Technology (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1991); Andrew Feenberg
& Alastair Hannay, eds., Technology and the Politics of Knowledge (Bloomington: Indiana University Press,
1995). 
52. Kirk Semple, “UN to Consider Whether to Ban Cloning of Embryos” New York Times (November 3, 2003),
<http://query.nytimes.com/gst/abstract.html?res=FA061FFE3A540C708CDDA80994DB404482>.
53. Stephen Labaton, “Rules Near on TV Piracy: Critics Press Their Case” New York Times (October 27, 2003),
<http://query.nytimes.com/gst/abstract.html?res=F00B10FB3A550C748EDDA90994DB404482>. See also
Brian Greene, The Elegant Universe: Superstrings, Hidden Dimensions, and the Quest for the Ultimate
Theory (New York: W.W. Norton & Company, 1999) at 3-17 and Batya Friedman & Peter H. Kahn, Jr.,
“Human Values, Ethics and Design” in Julie A. Jacko & Andrew Sears, eds., The Human-Computer
Interaction Handbook (New Jersey: Lawrence Erlbaum Associates, 2003) at 1177, <http://faculty.
washington.edu/pkahn/articles/Human_Values_Ethics_Design.pdf>. 
54. Stanley Fish, Is there a Text in this Class? (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1980) at 1-3.
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The universe of material objects…exists independently of us.… This image of
an impersonal, aloof cosmos was engraved onto the scientific consciousness
by the authority of Newton and his idea of events that unfold in an arena of
absolute space and time…. The essence of the “objectivist” position, nowa-
days termed naïve realism, is that the world consists of a collection of inde-
pendently existing “things” that are simply “out there” whether we observe
them or not.55
We can analogize the point Casti makes by alluding to facts as being
represented by the metaphor of the Necker cube. The meaning that we give to
the facts will depend on the stance or interest that is being pursued. Recalling
Kerr’s general argument, it seems to be that when we think about the internet
we are dealing with two possible perceptions of contractual relations in both the
online and offline environments: first, that binding commitments are concluded
against the background of a passive technological medium; and second, that the
technological becomes part of the process through which contractual commit-
ments are ascertained. Reed is of course correct in his assertion of the pervasive
nature of contract principles or that contractual relations can be situated in a
physical-geographical locality, and involving real individuals (“consent as
process”). That being said, it could not be seriously denied that the architecture
of the internet and of other methods of communication also alters the way in
which parties now communicate through technology (“consent as method”).56 By
characterizing attempts to integrate the online environment into the process by
which we define the nature of the binding commitment, it seems to be assumed
that contract doctrine is free of contradictions between “facts” and myths.57
Even if one assumes that the interpretive community is correct—whilst it is plain-
ly not the case—it is not entirely clear why it is acceptable to engage in fictions
when parties contract in real space but it is unacceptable to do this when we
attempt to configure legal relations in the online environment. 
Consider, for instance, the image of the meeting of the minds and the
evocation of its values when parties use the post. In Adams v. Lindsell, it was held
that legal relations were constituted when the acceptance was posted.58 The
offeror was bound even though the offeror had not received the letter of
response. In effect, a binding commitment was constituted without both parties
55. John L. Casti, Paradigms Lost: Images of Man in the Mirror of Science (New York: William Morrow, 1989) at
414-15 [emphasis in original].
56. Baal-Schem & Shinar, supra note 10; John Suler, “Psychology of Cyberspace: Identity Management in
Cyberspace,” <http://www.rider.edu/~suler/psycyber/identitymanage.html>; Peter Ludlow, “Self and
Community Online: Introduction to Chapter 5 of High Noon on the Electronic Frontier: Conceptual Issues
in Cyberspace,” <http://www-personal.umich.edu/~ludlow/intro5.html>; William J. Mitchell, City of Bits:
Space, Place and InfoBahn (Cambridge: Massachusetts Institute of Technology, 1996) c. 3 at 26; Sherry
Turkle, “Tinysex and Gender Trouble” IEEE Technology and Society Magazine 18:4 (Winter 1999/2000) 8;
Donna J. Haraway, Simians, Cyborgs, and Women: The Reinvention of Nature (New York: Routledge, 1991)
c. 8 at 149-81, <http://www.stanford.edu/dept/HPS/Haraway/CyborgManifesto.html>; Mark Poster,
“CyberDemocracy: Internet and the Public Sphere” University of California School of Humanities
<http://www.hnet.uci.edu/mposter/writings/democ.html>. 
57. See William Blackstone, Commentaries on the Laws of England. Book the Third (Oxford: Clarendon Press,
1768) at 267-68, who extols the value of fictions. See also Jeremy Bentham, The Works of Jeremy
Bentham: Published under the Superintendence of his Executor, John Bowring (New York: Russell &
Russell) vol. 4 at 498.
58. Supra note 20.
Online Contract Formation 121[2005] 2 UOLTJ 105
 
knowing that the promises had been exchanged.59 Or take the case where the
legal rule stipulates that a manufacturer has consented to be bound by a unilat-
eral act of a consumer who responds to an advertisement through the simple act
of purchasing a product. The phrase “meeting of minds” conjures up the image
of an agreement being constituted independently of physical reality. A realist
perspective suggests that both parties did not know that they were bound.
Another view is that the judges at common law have long relied upon fictions
and myths to give effect to the underlying values and norms of contemporary
society. The idea that legal facts correspond with a legal rule and that this
equates with objectivity and avoidance of bias is misleading.
Objective realism, in short, is not as might be thought—the product of
independent observations of fact.60 Indeed, what constitutes observable physical
ingredients is contentious. The judges at common law have avoided the contra-
dictions and artificiality of the rules by relying on the process of reasoning and
creative interpretations of facts and principles.61 Gordley, for example, highlights
the ambivalence surrounding the effect of mistake on the nature of consent.62 He
suggests that the desire to provide a remedy in contract disputes on the basis of
some idea of fairness prompted the willingness of the judiciary to rewrite the
contractual documents.63
Returning to the present discussion, arguments about whether the inter-
net is method or process cannot be portrayed purely as exercises in untangling
interpretation puzzles. The aim in drawing attention to the contestability of per-
spectives is to make explicit the fact that rule application involves the shaping of
identifiable things or attributes which are then referred to legal terms like offer
and acceptance.64 To summarize, an overemphasis on contract doctrine and the
linear approach to problem solving does not reflect the realities of online con-
tracting and, finally, leaves unexplained not only the role of the Electronic
Commerce (EC Directive) Regulations 2002 but also its complementarity with
conventional contract doctrine. The emphasis on the traditional, textbook
approach to contract analysis does not allow us to transcend the problem-solv-
ing paradigm. This restrictive view of contract law obscures a fundamental, deep-
seated argument about the basis upon which rules on contractual ordering of
social relations are now to be legitimated. This debate, it is suggested, cannot
be undertaken without reference to the contextual background of the internet.65
59. Supra note 20 at 683.
60. Supra note 55.
61. Supra note 57. 
62. James Gordley, The Philosophical Origins of Modern Contract Doctrine (Oxford: Clarendon, 1991) at 140-
46.
63. Ibid. 
64. Lon L. Fuller, “Positivism and Fidelity to Law—A Reply to Professor Hart” (1958) 71 Harv. L. Rev. 630 at
661-69.
65. See Manjoo, supra note 11 for the attempts by the Motion Picture Association of America to lobby the US
government to require computer-hardware manufacturers to include copy-protection schemes. This is the
justification provided by the entertainment industry: “The broadcast flag is a sequence of digital bits
embedded in a television program that signals that the program must be protected from unauthorized
redistribution. It does not distort the viewed picture in any way. Implementation of this broadcast flag will
permit digital TV stations to obtain high value content and assure consumers a continued source of attrac-
tive, free, over-the-air programming without limiting the consumers’ ability to make personal copies.”
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The rule-oriented approach fails to provide a comprehensive under-
standing of the dynamics of contract relations for three reasons. First, no evi-
dence is offered for the claims that technology is a passive conduit. Second,
characterization, in short, is not mandated by a legal rule but by the result of
arguments used to shape facts to “fit” into a legal rule or outcome.66 There is
room for pursuing alternative routes to understanding the legitimacy of contract-
ordering rules. Third, the rule-oriented approach implies that the institution of
contract is free of contradictions and omissions. This is not necessarily borne out
in the jurisprudence of the common law.67 It has already been shown that the
rational foundations in cases of the postal rule and mistake are attempts by the
common law to provide a result that blends pragmatism and fairness. The image
of a meeting of the minds epitomizes the reliance on abstractions to articulate
the values of private-ordering rules. Furthermore, both the postal rule and the
rule on instantaneous communications are defined by reference to the distinctive
architecture of the technical media. 
*
3. CODE, ARCHITECTURE AND MEDIATED CONSENT
WHAT IS THE GOVERNANCE CHALLENGE facing contract doctrine in the online
environment?68 The main shortcoming of the rule-oriented approach lies in its
inability to free itself from the internal critique and process of reasoning. Yochai
Benkler, a communications theorist, provides us with a heuristic that may help us
to unite contract doctrine with the communications system.69 Lessig sums up
Yochai’s ideas of the layers principle well: 
The layers that I mean here are the different layers within a communications
system that together make communications possible…. At the bottom is a
“physical” layer, across which communication travels. This is the computer, or
wires, that link computers on the Internet. In the middle is a “logical” or
“code” layer—the code that makes the hardware run. Here we might include
the protocols that define the Internet and the software upon which those pro-
tocols run. At the top is a “content” layer—the actual stuff that gets said or
transmitted across these wires. Here we include digital images, texts, on-line
movies, and the like. These three layers function together to define any par-
ticular communications system. Each of these layers in principle could be con-
trolled or could be free…. [W]e could imagine a world where the physical and
code layers were controlled but the content layer was not.70
66. Supra note 55.
67. See especially Gerald J. Postema, Bentham and the Common Law Tradition (Oxford: Oxford University
Press, 1986) at 263-301.
68. The following account builds on the insights provided by critical contract scholars like Atiyah, supra note 1;
Brownsword, supra note 1; Collins, supra note 1; and Furmston, supra note 1, c. 2 at 159-436. Their
accounts provide us with a foundation for understanding the political, cultural and economic foundations
of contemporary contract doctrine. It is beyond the scope of this paper to revisit their arguments and
analysis. The aim of the paper has been to take a small step towards bridging the gap between “theory”
and “technology” by exploring the benefits of re-thinking binding commitments in the online environment.
None of the authors have, however, undertaken a critique of Regulations 2002, infra note 95, through the
heuristic of code.
69. Benkler, supra note 46 at 561-63.
70. Lessig, The Future of Ideas, supra note 45 at 23.
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It is a mistake to characterize this account of the layer principle as just
another linguistic metaphor.71 Lessig’s description of the process of understand-
ing relations within a communications system is particularly relevant, as the oral
and textual tradition of communications is now being channelled through soft-
ware—which is ultimately what the communication system powered by the inter-
net is. Sceptics might argue that this medium of communication and the process
of constituting legal relations are no different from purchasing items from the
vending machines or automated services provided by banks or car parks. It is a
fair comment but only up to a point. In qualitative terms, however, it cannot be
seriously argued that the purchase of a book online is akin to the purchase of
refreshments or cigarettes from a vending machine. One outcome of the inter-
net becoming a prominent communications medium is that software assumes an
important role in a number of critical respects; software programs now structure
and process the choices, needs and expectations of both the retailer and the
consumer. This, in essence, is Lessig’s “code-is-law” thesis. 
What we are witnessing in the online environment is a new process by
which social and economic relations are initially created and then constituted.
Consider for example the case where a user on the internet receives a pop-up
advertisement from the Microsoft website. The message indicates that the user’s
Office 2000 program is in need of an update. This service is free and the user can
only take advantage of the service by entering into a click-wrap agreement. The
software prevents the user from using the service until the user clicks on the icon
stating, “I Agree.” The user purports to enter into an agreement when he clicks
on the icon. Is the user bound by the click-wrap agreement?72 What do we
expect of the software agent if the user does not scroll through the agreement
or misinterprets terms in the agreement? Should the doctrine of caveat emptor
be applicable here?73
These questions are equally relevant when we turn to the hypothetical
case study involving “A” and “B.” Is there an agreement between the buyer and
the seller when the buyer signifies his assent to buying a laptop by clicking on
the mouse? Obviously, we cannot say that there is a meeting of the minds at the
time of receipt or at the time of sending. In the former case, electronic agents
do not possess the legal persona and attributes of natural persons.74 In the lat-
ter, even if the electronic intermediary possesses these features, there can be no
meeting of the minds because each party is unlikely to know that other has
knowledge of the acceptance. We could, of course, use the analogies in the
71. See generally Peter Goodrich, Legal Discourse: Studies in Linguistics, Rhetoric and Legal Analysis (London:
Macmillan, 1987); Peter Goodrich, Languages of Law: From Logics of Memory to Nomadic Masks (London:
Weidenfeld & Nicholson, 1990); J.M. Balkin, “Deconstructive Practice and Legal Theory” (1987) 96 Yale L.J.
743; and Jaques Derrida, “Force of Law: The ‘Mystical Foundation of Authority,’” trans. by Mary
Quaintance, (1990) 11 Cardozo L. Rev. 919.
72. See <http://office.microsoft.com/home>. 
73. What values should policy-makers and judges now emphasize when parties contract online? Even greater
problems are posed with the value of consent in the online environment. It is useful to recall that in the
postal rule, consent was implied by the act of posting. Is it right to imply consent in the online environ-
ment by the mere act of clicking on the mouse? Can consent by clicking the mouse be deemed to deprive
the buyer, should he change his mind and attempt to communicate his withdrawal by using an expeditious
method like telephone or fax?
74. Tom Allen & Robin Widdison, “Can Computers Make Contracts?” (1996) 9 Harv.J.L.& Tech. 26.
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postal rule and instantaneous communications, but those do not resolve the
conundrum.75 Indeed, the phrase “meeting of the minds” is a distraction. The
real question that the use of the online communications system poses is this:
what constitutes assent in the cultural and economic environment of software?
Before we examine the way in which the communications infrastructure can be
said to provide an intuition pump for understanding the dynamics of contract
relations, a caveat is warranted. Further study and research are still needed to
explore in greater depth how the communications system will result in refine-
ments to be offered by policymakers and judges.76 Just as the events of the six-
teenth to the eighteenth centuries provided the building blocks for the way that
we now rationalize binding agreements, so too are we entering a period in which
issues of consent and agreement will in time be resolved through a combination
of precedent and legislative enactment.
The dynamics of contractual relations in the online environment can be
analyzed in terms of three layered components: the architectural, the design and
the doctrinal.77 It should be noted that many of the points raised in this part of
the paper are not internet specific, since the process of understanding contrac-
tual relations can be similarly adopted in real-world transactions. 
3.1. Consent as Architecture
Consider, for example, the situation where a book is purchased over the tele-
phone or at a bookstore. For a binding commitment to be constituted, the book
must be identified and the purchase price paid. The method of communications
does not prevent us from indicating when a binding commitment has been con-
cluded. The exchange of promises and the resulting binding commitment are
said to emerge when the offer is accepted. There is a meeting of the minds. The
system of communications powered by the internet provides a distinct architec-
ture where relations are constituted through clicks of the mouse and through the
response of the computer software to each.78
In his seminal works, Code and The Future of Ideas, Lessig uses the
metaphors of architecture and code to make explicit the new intuition pump for
understanding private ordering and the traditional institutions of governance.79
He begins by acknowledging that centralized institutional structures of control
75. See e.g. Pretty Pictures, supra note 24 (the court had to address the question of whether a contract could
be formed when email was used during the negotiation process). See also J. Englefield, “Will your email
correspondence result in a binding contract?” (2003) 17(9) Corporate Briefing 12 (this article provides a
normative account of the challenges facing businesses as online methods of communication are increasing-
ly incorporated into the negotiation process). See also Kevin de Haan, “Betting Contracts: Determining
where a bet is struck” (2003) 5:7 E-Commerce Law & Policy 10 (The author provides an overview of the
scope of the postal rule with regard to the placement of bets online. He concludes that certainty, with
regard to the applicable principles, can be promoted by bookmakers placing standard terms on the home-
page); Peter Howitt, “Avoiding legal uncertainty” (2003) 5:5 E-Commerce Law & Policy 12 (the primary
focus is on the restrictions placed by the Unfair Contract Terms Act 1977 on computer contracts).
76. See e.g. EC, Pilot Survey, supra note 41.
77. The accompanying account will not review the detailed accounts of the internet architecture. Further
details can be found in Reed, supra note 1. See also Mitchell, supra note 56 at 111.
78. Mark Stefik, ed., Internet Dreams: Archetypes, Myths and Metaphors (Cambridge: Massachusetts Institue
of Technology, 1996); Howard Rheingold, The Virtual Community: Homesteading on the Electronic Frontier
(Reading, Mass.: Addison-Wesley, 1993).
79. Lessig, supra note 46.
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and ordering provide a counterpoint to the Hobbesian prognosis; in a market
economy, the modalities of law, market and norms provide the checks and bal-
ances in the construction of society. The hardware and software of the internet
architecture, according to Lessig, now provide a framework for understanding
governance. Code assumes some features of the institution of law, such as reg-
ulability, values and control. Although Lessig’s normative premises may be ques-
tioned, the metaphor he employs can be incorporated into a way that we could
begin to think about online contract formation. 
The metaphor of architecture makes two dimensions of the contract
matrix explicit. First, the legal rules for constituting relations can be viewed as
subsisting within the technological infrastructure: the physical, the substantive
and the content.80 For example, media—either in its crude form of oral commu-
nications between parties dealing at arms length or in the form of telephone, fax
and online-communications infrastructure—can be seen as constituting the
“physical” layer; social norms and values, the rules on contract formation, doc-
trines on contract vitiation and enforcement, and the design of the computer
software program can be seen as constituting the substantive layer; and the
duties, rights and obligations that law and the market attempt to regulate can be
seen as constituting the “content” layer. 
Second, each communication method embodies a distinctive architec-
ture—these features being either active or passive. The latter category will
include the purchase of goods or services through the use of the post, a tele-
phone or a visit. Each form of communication or media—be it oral, written, post
or instantaneous—embodies a distinctive mode of coordination. The architec-
ture of the telephone, for example, can be differentiated from that of the post.
The features of both media can be distinguished from a situation where two par-
ties enter into an agreement in the presence of one another. More generally, the
benefit of employing the architecture metaphor is that we need not artificially
exclude the instrumental role of technology in constituting social relations. 
One feature that distinguishes online methods of communication from
traditional media is that software now assumes an instrumental role in constitut-
ing agreements. If the buyer intends to make a purchase online, he will need to
engage with the code. The software interprets the steps in the negotiations
purely on the basis of the clicks made by the buyer. If the buyer does not com-
municate the range of predicted responses, either the process will cease or a
new range of options will be presented for consideration. These are not the only
avenues through which software attempts to regulate relationships in the online
environment. For example, the website may have agreements that stipulate the
process by which commitments become binding. Refusal to assent to the terms
will lead to the termination of the transaction. This may not be a bad thing, since
a buyer may move on to another online retailer.
80. The layer principle is sufficiently expansive in its idea to accommodate the media, the rules and the con-
tent. It is instructive to note that much of the legal infrastructure provided by contract law resonates with
the interplay between the physical, substantive and content layers. It is not without significance that, as the
architecture alters, so too does law’s view of the technology and the appropriate rule or norm that is to be
used to govern the situation. 
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It is true that end-to-end architecture may create new opportunities and
choices. Where code assumes the identity of law through the programming of its
values, the user has two options: he either complies with the pre-determined
structure of communications or moves on to another website. Code’s latent
ambiguities have the ability to structure choices and preferences. Yet, despite
this, it cannot be overlooked that contract law is designed to resist the pressures
of relations descending into a market for lemons. Code embeds values, which
cannot be dismissed when we think about the values to be pursued by contract.
The orthodox values of transparency, certainty and autonomy may now be arbi-
trarily marginalized by code. This outcome threatens to displace the traditional
idea that the rules on agreement can be aligned with a model of consent. 
3.2. Design as Consent81
Central to Lessig’s approach to understanding the new governance framework in
cyberspace is the imbalance in cultural or economic relations resulting from the
control residing in the owners of code. Lessig views the latent ambiguity of code
as having the capacity to undermine established democratic governance
processes. This is, perhaps, an extreme view. That being said, many are likely to
view a thesis of code as a form of internet exceptionalism or as “cyberspace fal-
lacy”; the activities on the internet take place in real space, involve human beings
and exist within the regulatory reach of domestic and international laws.
Although we may not share Lessig’s normative outlook, the insight about design
space is pertinent to our study. Lessig ought not to be viewed as introducing an
argument about technological determinism or as claiming that we need cus-
tomized laws for the internet. Attempts to characterize Lessig in these terms are
tantamount to raising a man of straw. The reality, however, is that Lessig’s “code-
is-law” thesis makes the subtle but nonetheless important point that the software
program has embedded values. They conceal a latent ambiguity, which can
either enhance the values of private ordering or impose the bias of their creators. 
These are not idle concerns. For example, the prevalence of digital-
rights-management software illustrates an important feature in the structuring of
contractual licences and in the enforcement of rights arising under the transac-
tion.82 Technology, according to Lessig, can never be ideologically neutral nor
content free. This is a characterization that is in direct conflict with those that
view the communications system as purely one of method. It is also a character-
ization that understands that technology cannot be divorced from its cultural
attributes. Those who reject Lessig’s arguments are likely to suggest that real-
world rules will continue to provide the answers to the governance challenges. 
81. See later discussion on case law involving computer software and browsewrap contracts. See also Bill
Gavers, “Designing for Homo Ludens” Computer Related Design, Royal College of Art (2002),
<http://www.interaction.rca.ac.uk/equator/papers/design_for_homo_ludens.pdf>.
82. See OUT-LAW.COM, News, “Does P2P help or hinder music sales?” (May 10, 2002), <http://www.out-
law.com/php/page.php3?page_id=doespphelporhin1021028325.>; Motion Picture Association of America,
Jack Valenti Press Releases, “Study Shows Copyright Industries as Largest Contributor to the U.S.
Economy” (April 22, 2002), <http://www.mpaa.org/jack/2002/2002_04_22.htm>; Motion Picture
Association of America, Jack Valenti Press Releases, “A Clear Present and Future Danger: The potential
undoing of America’s greatest export trade prize” (April 23, 2002), <http://www.mpaa.org/jack/2002/
2002_04_23b.htm>.
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This is correct in part. For example, it could be suggested that the post
or telephone are appropriate equivalents to the online methods of communica-
tion. That being said, this approach merely appeals to the idea that contract prin-
ciples operate in a technological vacuum. Even if this were the case, taken to the
logical extreme, we should ask ourselves whether we should subscribe to the fol-
lowing line of analysis: if the agreement in question is brought within the rules of
contract, it must follow, ex post, that the ideals of contract are realized.83 The
conclusion that we are encouraged to accept cannot be faulted if technology is
content neutral and value free.84 This is not the case in the online contracting
environment. Consider, for example, the manner in which browsewrap contracts
and online purchases of software structure the options and the operative terms
governing purchases by online consumers. Consent is artificially induced by
defining the routes of agreement, which ultimately compels the buyer to align his
interests with those of the seller. 
Another example of the potential bias inherent in the technology can be
seen in the way that electronic agents, without any restraint, monitor the manner
and use of software and digital products.85 The recent media coverage of digital-
rights-management software deployed by manufacturers to define the uses to
which computer software or music compact discs may be put is another example
of the potential bias in technology. The primary purpose of the technology is to
prefer the interests of the sellers and not those of the consumers.86
We can cast the issue of design values in wider terms. Despite the com-
plexity of the governance challenges, the institution of the law has been
extremely resilient and has attempted to cope with tensions arising from our
technological creations with some measure of consistency. An example of such a
tension can be seen in the emergence of the neighbourhood principle during an
intensive period of social and economic restructuring that took place in post-
agrarian English society; the ruling in effect opens an alternative line of justicia-
ble remedies to parties who have suffered damage as a consequence of
manufacturers’ breach of acceptable standards of care.87
83. See Micheal Luck, Peter McBurney & Chris Preist, Agent Technology: Enabling Next Generation
Computing, A Roadmap for Agent Based Computing (Agent Link II, 2003), <http://www.agentlink.org/
admin/docs/2003/2003-48.pdf>.
84. See William W. Gaver, Jake Beaver & Steve Benford, “Ambiguity as a Resource for Design” Interaction
Design Research Studio, Royal College of Art (2003), <http://www.interaction.rca.ac.uk/equator/papers/
ambiguity.pdf>.
85. See e.g. in the structuring process of Windows XP technology, which allegedly directs consumers to use
the Internet Explorer web browser even if they expressed a different preference. See Associated Press,
News, “Microsoft Lassos Music Customers” (October 20, 2003), <http://wired.com/news/business/
0,1367,60899,00.html>.
86. See, however, Laurie Cranor, “Bias and Responsibility in ‘Neutral’ Social Protocols” (Position piece present-
ed at the DIMACS workshop on Design for Values: Ethical, Social and Political Dimensions of Information
Technology, February 1998) Computers & Society 17 (1998), <http://lorrie.cranor.org/pubs/dimacs-values.
html>.
87. Compare Hedley Byrne v. Heller (1963), [1964] A.C. 465, [1963] 2 All E.R. 575 (HL) [Hedley cited to A.C.].
The developments here can be contrasted with the recognition by the law in Hedley that financial loss was
justiciable in respect of non-physical damage. This would have been unthinkable half a century previously.
The heated arguments surrounding the proper limits of tort law in contemporary society and, specifically,
surrounding the failure of large pension institutions and the liability of professional-accountancy firms for
tortious liability, are characteristic of the complex interactions that arise among the many layers within tech-
nology, society and law.
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We also see similar interactions and tensions in the debates on the legit-
imacy of extending nineteenth-century copyright rules and norms to the digital
media; the extension of proprietary interests from “copy” right to “access” rights
is not coincidental as the commodification of ideas also reflects the important
shifts in the way that we think about the values embedded in technology and the
ramifications of adopting their rules.88 Attempts by the entertainment industry to
impose technological solutions on the way that we consume music raise not just
legal issues but also impinge on cultural ideas about music and the way that it
ought to be consumed. Despite the economic arguments put forward to justify
the contemporary role of copyright in the new media, it would seem that the fate
of the technological prescriptions may involve a careful compromise between
end-to-end, cultural expectations and political expediency.89
3.3. Contracts as Consent or Code
Attempts to understand the nature of a binding commitment through contract
rules and the deployment of equivalent analogies conceal a tautology. The
emphasis on rules and on the application of these to the facts results in an
assumption of that which needs to be understood in the first place. For example,
by focusing on whether the particular facts fit into the rules and the category of
cases, it might be tempting to conclude that, since the binding commitment falls
within the scope of the rules, the obligations correspond with the values of con-
tract law. An agreement, as texts and cases in contract emphasize, is the prod-
uct of a voluntary exchange of promises. An agreement implies that there is a
meeting of the minds or that there is consent. There is, however, a big difference
between the facts fitting in with the discourse of specific categories and the basis
upon which we regard the values as being present. 
In the absence of a meeting of the minds, can there be said to be an
agreement that satisfies the core values of contract law? Does it make sense to
import this image into the online environment? Radin has provided a useful
account of the way that the online environment now challenges the traditional
ideals associated with the image of the meeting of minds.90 She begins by
88. See Julie E. Cohen, “A Right to Read Anonymously: A Closer Look at ‘Copyright Management’ in
Cyberspace” (1996) 28 Conn. L. Rev. 981, <http://ssrn.com/abstract=17990>; Julie E. Cohen, “Some
Reflections on Copyright Management Systems and Laws Designed to Protect Them” (1997) 12 Berkeley
Tech. L.J. 161, <http://www.law.berkeley.edu/journal/btlj/articles/vol12/Cohen/html/reader.html>.
89. See generally Janelle Brown, “MP3 Crackdown” Salon.com (November 17, 1999), <http://www.salon.com/
tech/log/1999/11/17/riaa/index.html>; David S. Cheval, “Copyright Protection in the Digital Age: The Case
against Napster” (2001) 6 W. Va. J. L. & T. 1.1, <http://www.wvu.edu/~wvjolt/Arch/Cheval/Cheval.htm>;
Marshall Brain, “How Compact Discs (CDs) Work” howstuffworks.com, <http://howstuffworks.com/cd.htm>;
Kathy Bowrey & Matthew Rimmer, “Rip, Mix, Burn: The Politics of Peer to Peer and Copyright Law” (2002)
7:8 First Monday Peer-Reviewed Journal on the Internet, <http://www.firstmonday.org/issues/issue7_8/
bowrey/index.html>; KaZaA B.V. v. Buma & Stemra, 2002 AE 0805, (28 March 2002), Amsterdam
1370/01SKG (Amsterdam CA), <http://www.rechtspraak.nl/uitspraak/frameset.asp?ui_id=32573> (original
Dutch judgement); John Schwartz, “With CableTV at MIT, who needs Napster?” New York Times (October
27, 2003), <http://www.uhoh.org/nyt-20031027-mit-cable-music.htm>; Richard Stallman, “The GNU
Manifesto,” <http://www.fsf.org/gnu/manifesto.html>; Richard Stallman, “The GNU Operating System and
the Free Software Movement” in Chris DeBona, Sam Ockman & Mark Stone, eds., Open Sources: Voices
from the Open Source Revolution (Sebastopol, Calif.: O’Reilly and Associates, 1999) at 53; M. Pfahl,
“Giving Music Away to Make Money: Independent Musicians on the Internet” (2001) 6:8 First Monday
Peer-Reviewed Journal on the Internet, <www.firstmonday.org/issues/issue6_8/pfahl/index.html>.
90. Radin, “Humans, Computers and Binding Commitment,” supra note 8. 
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observing the significance of the qualitative and quantitative differences
between online and offline contracting. To this she adds that: 
The contract-as-consent model is the traditional picture of how binding com-
mitment is arrived at between two humans. It involves a meeting of the minds
between two humans, or at least voluntariness, or at least consent. These
terms are both fuzzy and contested; the traditional picture is out of focus. At
minimum, consent involves a knowing understanding of what one is doing in
a context in which it is actually possible for one to do otherwise, and an affir-
mative action in doing something, rather than a merely passive acquiescence
in accepting something. These indicia translate into requirements that terms
be understood, that alternatives be available, and probably that bargaining
be possible.91
The fuzzy picture is now complicated by the emergence of a wide range
of contracts entered into between humans and computers. Her central argument
with regard to the governance challenges should now be familiar: the online
environment does challenge normative ideas and images of contract. What is the
role of contract law when disintermediated contracting becomes the norm? Her
argument reflects the earlier account of the hidden bias in the instrumental role
of computers and technology in ordering contractual relations: 
… there exists something of a puzzle about how to justify changes of position
imposed on one private party by another, and that the advent of contract in
cyberspace may make the puzzle more urgent. The problem, in a nutshell, is
that our ordinary-discourse commitment to a consent-based system will come
into clearer conflict with practices that do not seem consensual.92
Two conclusions can be drawn. First, by viewing code as law, we can
avoid the parsimonious explanation of the discourse-specific narrative of con-
tract rules. By integrating the hardware and software into online communications
we can incorporate our insights about control, autonomy and acquiescence into
the way we begin to evaluate the Electronic Commerce (EC Directive)
Regulations 2002. Technology ceases to be regarded as providing passive meth-
ods of communication because the values it embodies assume a number of char-
acteristics of law. 
Second, the metaphor of code also makes explicit the fact that the image
of contract as a meeting of the minds has very little purchase in the online envi-
ronment. That being said, by taking into account the perspective of consumers, it
becomes pertinent to assess whether consent becomes an important value in con-
tract formation. The programming of values, which have hidden bias, all too clear-
ly suggests that unwary users can contract away their rights to autonomy, choice
and consent. Code permits us to draw attention to the fact that there is a con-
siderable difference between the argument that contract principles apply and the
argument that the values underpinning the ideal of the contract model may be
overreached by the design values of internet methods of communications. 
91. Ibid. at 1125–26.
92. Ibid. at 1127–28.
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The interpretive community overlooks both the distinction and the sig-
nificance of the latter argument for the way that we think about the consent
model of contracts. The question of whether an agreement is now to be consti-
tuted by the sending of an email or by the clicking of the mouse in the web form
presupposes an appreciation of a hierarchy of values and public-policy goals.
This observation can be underscored by the fact that the postal and instanta-
neous-communications rules are products of judicial attempts to rationalize their
legitimacy against the backdrop of the interaction between technology, culture
and politics and their significance for the way autonomy, bargains and morality
are perceived and valued. If we are prepared to accept that such interactions are
necessary in order to underline the legitimacy of the rules that we set in place,
should it be any different when technological media now assume a pivotal role
in the online contractual matrix? Indeed, by adopting a nuanced overview of con-
tracting in the online environment, we can avoid assuming that the interaction
between the values of technology and those of contract are irreconcilable. The
aim of this modelling is to transform the technological infrastructure into a
heuristic for grasping the dynamics of binding commitments in the online envi-
ronment.93 I propose that online contract formation is best understood in terms
of architecture and code. This model of mediated consent, it is suggested, pro-
vides an appropriate vernacular for explaining the central role of Electronic
Commerce (EC Directive) Regulations 2002, the reach of its provisions and how
it is reconcilable with contract doctrine. 
To summarize, legal rules and principles merely provide us with a partial
picture of the governance challenges facing the institution of contract law.94 The
claims and assumptions underpinning the characterization of technology are fun-
damentally flawed since they fail to illuminate the hidden bias of technology in
the online environment and its potential for eroding the image of contract as
being the product of consent or a meeting of the minds. Furthermore, the com-
ing into force of the Electronic Commerce (EC Directive) Regulations 2002, with
their emphasis on the technological processes, weakens the argument that an
understanding of the technological infrastructure impairs legal analysis of bind-
ing commitments. The fact that the interpretive community has yet to engage
fully with the developments in the online contract environment need not detain
93. See generally H.L.A. Hart, “Positivism and the Separation of Law and Morals” (1958) 71 Harv. L. Rev. 593 at
606–15.
94. See generally Jerome Frank, Law and the Modern Mind (New York: Tudor Publishing Company, 1936) at
134–38.
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us because we can look at what policy-makers have done in the United Kingdom
with the above-mentioned regulatory initiative.95
*
4. EMERGING THEMES AND THE ELECTRONIC COMMERCE 
(EC DIRECTIVE) REGULATIONS 2002
IN MANY WAYS the perceived irreconcilability between doctrine and the Electronic
Commerce (EC Directive) Regulations 2002 is explicable on the grounds that the
issue of binding commitments has been approached from an unduly narrow per-
spective. Those who adopt a rule-oriented approach define online contract rela-
tions in terms of the boundaries mapped by doctrine. Those who follow this
approach view contract as a regime of rules—as a regime for solving problems.
The communications system is not integrated into the process by which agree-
ments are constituted. The layer principle emphasizes the emergence of software
as a means for establishing power relations in the online environment.96 In one
sense, a contract can be seen as a metaphor where law enables one party to exer-
cise power in its relations with another. How should we now articulate the contract
doctrine and its values in the light of the hypothetical case study, asking whether
an agreement has been concluded and what are the terms of the agreement?
The above-mentioned regulations need to be viewed in the context of
the coming of age of the institution of contract, which goes to some extent to
redress the apparent imbalance in the power relations between the online retail-
er and the consumer. For example, the wording of the provisions—the focus of
which notably is on agreements rather than on the orthodox narrative of doc-
trine—places great emphasis on the contents of the agreement and on the obser-
vance of procedural formalities. It should also be said that the policy informing
95. Electronic Commerce (EC Directive) Regulations 2002, S.I. 2002/2013, <http://www.legislation.hmso.gov.
uk/si/si2002/20022013.htm> [Regulations 2002]. There are three Directives that should be taken into
account when we think about binding commitments: EC, Directive 2000/31/EC of the European Parliament
and of the Council of 8 June 2000 on certain legal aspects of information society services, in particular
electronic commerce, in the Internal Market (Directive on electronic commerce), [2000] O.J. L. 178/1,
<http://www.europa.eu.int/smartapi/cgi/sga_doc?smartapi!celexapi!prod!CELEXnumdoc&1g=EN&numdoc
=32000L0031>; EC, Directive 1999/93/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 13 December
1999 on a Community framework for electronic signatures, [2000] O.J. L. 13/12, <http://www.europa.eu.
int/smartapi/cgi/sga_doc?smartapi!celexapi!prod!CELEXnumdoc&1g=EN&numdoc=31999L0093>; and EC,
Directive 97/7/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 20 May 1997 on the protection of con-
sumers in respect of distance contracts, [1997] O.J. L. 144/19, <http://www.europa.eu.int/smartapi/cgi/
sga_doc?smartapi!celexapi!prod!CELEXnumdoc&1g=EN&numdoc=31997L0007> [Directive 97/7/EC dis-
tance contracts]. It is beyond the scope of this paper in considering the US regulatory initiatives that
attempt to clarify the core and reach of binding commitments in the online environment. See e.g.
Electronic Signatures in Global and National Commerce Act, Pub. L. No. 106-229, 114 Stat. 464 (2000)
(codified as Contracts at 15 U.S.C. 7001), <http://frwebgate.access.gpo.gov/cgi-bin/getdoc.cgi?dbname=
106_cong_public_laws&docid=f:publ229.106.pdf>; Uniform Electronic Transactions Act, §§ 7, 5 and 3
(1999), <http://www.law.upenn.edu/bll/ulc/fnact99/1990s/ueta99.htm>; Uniform Computer Information
Transactions Act, §§ 107, 202 & 103 (2002), <http://www.law.upenn.edu/bll/ulc/ucita/2002final.htm>
[UCITA]. According to § 202 “(a) A contract may be formed in any manner sufficient to show agreement,
including offer and acceptance or conduct of both parties or operations of electronic agents which recog-
nize the existence of a contract.” Section 103 prescribes the scope and exclusions. It is of particular inter-
est to note that UCITA does incorporate into the rules the expectations and the customary norms in the
computing and software industry. Further and updated information can now be found at <www.nccusl.org>
and <www.ucitaonline.com>.
96. Accord Lawrence B. Solum & Minn Chung, “The Layers Principle: Internet Architecture and the Law” (2003)
University of San Diego Public Law and Legal Theory Research Paper 55, <http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/
papers.cfm?abstract_id=416263>.
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contractual ordering cannot be separated from the forces shaping the ideological
“European experiment,” which is to promote trust and reduce barriers to the free
movement of information-society services between member states of the
European Union.97 The interests shaping the new online market order have char-
acteristic economic and political overtones.98 The elaborate process by which the
regulations define an agreement also reflects the civil-law concept of “good faith”
and the currency of ideas about consumer welfare. A pilot study, E-Commerce in
Europe, illustrates the target audience of the enactment: 
Confirming the need for a trustworthy environment in which to conduct e-
commerce, enterprises cited the uncertainties about the conditions under
which transactions take place as the main problems when using e-purchasing
or as a barrier to using it…. Uncertainties concerning contracts, terms of deliv-
ery and guarantees were said to be of high or of some importance by 40% of
enterprises….99
The Electronic Commerce (EC Directive) Regulations 2002 attempt to
strike a balance by focusing on two key areas of governance challenges associ-
ated with online contract formation: (i) those arising from the fact that the com-
munications system now creates a new set of dynamics in social and economic
97. See EC, Commission, Proposal for a European Parliament and Council Directive on certain legal aspects of
electronic commerce in the internal market COM (1998) 586 final, O.J. C. 30/4, <http://www.europa.eu.int/
smartapi/cgi/sga_doc?smartapi!celexapi!prod!CELEXnumdoc&1g=EN&numdoc=51998PC0586&model=gui
chett>. Article 9 of the Draft Directive requires Member States to make provision in their legislation in
order to ensure that the legal requirements applicable to the contractual process neither prevent the effec-
tive use of electronic contracts nor lead to such contracts being deprived of legal validity because of the
fact that they have been concluded electronically. See also EC, Commission, Resolution on the communi-
cation from the Commission to the Council, the European Parliament, the Economic and Social Committee
and the Committee of the Regions on a European Initiative in Electronic Commerce (COM(97) 157 final),
[1998] O.J. C. 167/171 at 203, <http://www.europa.eu.int/smartapi/cgi/sga_doc?smartapi!celexapi!prod!
CELEXnumdoc&1g=EN&numdoc=51997DC0157&model=guichett>. See also EC, Commission, Opinion of
the Economic and Social Committee on the ‘Communication from the Commission to the Council and the
European Parliament on European contract law’ COM/2001/398 final, [2002] O.J. C. 241/1,
<http://www.europa.eu.int/smartapi/cgi/sga_doc?smartapi!celexapi!prod!CELEXnumdoc&1g=EN&num-
doc=52001DC0398&model=guichett> for the move towards convergence of national contract laws. See
generally documents at <http://europa.eu.int/information_society/topics/ebusiness/ecommerce/index_en.
htm> and <http://www.dti.gov.uk/industries/ecommunications/electronic_commerce_directive_0031ec.html>.
As for the history of the development of a unified regulatory framework, see documents at
<http://europa.eu.int/information_society/topics/ebusiness/ecommerce/8epolicy_elaw/law_ecommerce/leg
al/1ecommerce/index_en.htm>.
98. See Directive 97/7/EC distance contracts, supra note 95; The Consumer Protection (Distance Selling)
Regulations 2000, S.I. 2000/2334, <http://www.legislation.hmso.gov.uk/si/si2000/20002334.htm> [Distance
Selling Regulations 2000]. (This UK regulation implements the Directive 97/7/EC distance contracts). The
Regulations must be read alongside the obligations imposed on businesses under Distance Selling
Regulations 2000.
99. EC, Commission, E-Commerce in Europe: Results of the pilot surveys carried out in 2001 (Eurostat 2002) at
36, <http://europa.eu.int/comm/enterprise/ict/studies/lr-e-comm-in-eur-2001.pdf>.
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relations; and (ii) those arising from the fact that autonomy is now defined by the
design of software.100
What emerges from the regulations is twofold: first, the act of constitut-
ing an agreement is kept separate from the terms binding the parties and, sec-
ond, the design of the communications system provides the forum for
approximating the intentions of both parties. We can examine each point in turn.
For instance, it is made clear that, save where email or more traditional media
are used, online electronic contracts can only be constituted in accordance with
the provisions in the regulations. The jurisprudential question of whether the
phrase “meeting of the minds” can be applied where one or both parties to the
transaction are electronic agents is now to be regarded as only being of aca-
demic interest.101 The focal point is on the questions of identifying consent and
its contents.102 The regulations do not prescribe a set of categories or a narrative
as to what an agreement (or acceptance) entails. This is a policy prescription
intent on ensuring that the regulations embody institutional flexibility and tech-
nological neutrality in the communication infrastructure. 
Could the policy of “technological neutrality” be seen as undermining
Lessig’s “code-is-law” thesis? There is some foundation for this question.
Regulation 12, for example, states that the placement of an order need not nec-
essarily be characterized as a contractual offer. More generally, the open-ended
character of the rules on contract formation may be seen as legitimating the cau-
tionary overtones of the interpretive constituency. According to this view, sub-
stantive contract doctrine rather than code may seem to provide a de jure
organizing framework for discourse. These assertions cannot go without com-
ment. Intuitively, the concept “technology neutrality” implies objectivity. It is also
to be regarded as a basis for emphasizing the primacy and rationality of doctrine. 
This conflation of “technological neutrality” and “linearity” is to be
100. Regulations 2002, supra note 95. Regulation 2(1) provides:
‘information society services’…recital 17 of the Directive as covering ‘any service normally provid-
ed for remuneration, at a distance, by means of electronic equipment for the processing including
digital compression and storage of data, and at the individual request of a recipient of a ser-
vice’…has the meaning set out in Article 2(a) of the Directive, (which refers to Article 1(2) of
Directive 98/34/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 22 June 1998 laying down a
procedure for the provision of information in the field of technical standards and regulations…, as
amended by Directive 98/48/EC of 20 July 1998….
Regulation 2(1) covers service providers utilizing commercial communications in their dealings with con-
sumers. This is said to cover:
‘commercial communication’…a communication, in any form, designed to promote, directly or
indirectly, the goods, services or image of any person pursuing a commercial, industrial or craft
activity or exercising a regulated profession, other than a communication—(a) consisting only of
information allowing direct access to the activity of that person including a geographic address, a
domain name or an electronic mail address; or (b) relating to the goods, services or image of that
person provided that the communication has been prepared independently of the person making
it (and for this purpose, a communication prepared without financial consideration is to be taken
to have been prepared independently unless the contrary is shown).
101. That being said, there are some refinements to this view.
102. See e.g. “E-Shoppers Are Now E-Spenders” Business Week online (November 24, 2003),
<http://www.businessweek.com/technology/content/nov2003/tc20031125_6802_tc136.htm?c=bwtech
nov27&n=link1&t=email>, which suggests that retailers are going out of their way to ensure that technolo-
gy is utilized to realize consumers’ expectations of online transactions; Alex Salkever, “These Sites Are a
Shopper’s Dream” Business Week online (November 25, 2003), <http://www.businessweek.com/
technology/content/nov2003/tc20031125_1528_tc136.htm?c=bwtechnov27&n=link3&t=email> for the way
that architecture can be used to re-intermediate contracting parties.
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avoided. Indeed, recourse to orthodox analogies with the post or with the instan-
taneous-communications rule is likely to be an encumbrance when thinking
about what kind of act is sufficient to manifest assent. Of course, we still need to
ask whether a retailer has fulfilled the statutory obligations imposed on him by
the regulations. A fundamental objection to the idea that the policy of “techno-
logical neutrality” constrains the “code-is-law” thesis has already been
addressed; the idea of technological neutrality conceals a tautology to which I
have already alluded. In defining the scope and reach of the rules on online con-
tract formation, we cannot avoid dealing with the question of why the rules on
online contract formation are constructed in the way that they are. The empha-
sis on procedural safeguards in the process of constituting contractual relations,
notwithstanding the perception of the process as being arbitrary or open-ended,
is perhaps an unavoidable consequence of acknowledging the imbalance in the
relations between the buyer and the seller. 
More important, however, is the significance of the strategy designed to
impose a list of requirements on online service providers. The regulations intro-
duce two new ideas about online contract formation that are implicit in the
“code-is-law” thesis. First, the placement of the onus on the retailer to fulfil the
various obligations creates a presumption of non-agreement. The regulations
assume that retailers have the means and the incentive to program design val-
ues, which ensure that there is no ambivalence surrounding the issue of assent.
Second, contract relations are now seen as being fluid and as possibly involving
a process that may extend the initial-communication phase. 
The “code-is-law” thesis can therefore be seen as providing a heuristic
for understanding the dynamics of contractual relations in the online environ-
ment. It cannot now be readily assumed that a binding commitment arises by the
mere act of clicking “I Accept” since “B” can rely on Regulation 9, which pro-
vides that: 
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(1) Unless parties who are not consumers have agreed otherwise, where a
contract is to be concluded by electronic means a service provider shall, prior
to an order being placed by the recipient of a service, provide to that recipi-
ent in a clear, comprehensible and unambiguous manner the information set
out in (a) to (d) below—
(a) the different technical steps to follow to conclude the contract;
(b) whether or not the concluded contract will be filed by the serv-
ice provider and whether it will be accessible;
(c) the technical means for identifying and correcting input errors
prior to the placing of the order; and
(d) the languages offered for the conclusion of the contract.
(2) Unless parties who are not consumers have agreed otherwise, a service
provider shall indicate which relevant codes of conduct he subscribes to and
give information on how those codes can be consulted electronically.
(3) Where the service provider provides terms and conditions applicable to
the contract to the recipient, the service provider shall make them available
to him in a way that allows him to store and reproduce them.
(4) The requirements of paragraphs (1) and (2) above shall not apply to con-
tracts concluded exclusively by exchange of electronic mail or by equivalent
individual communications.103
There are two possible ways of interpreting the outcome to the relations
between “A” and “B” in our hypothetical case study. One way would be to ascer-
tain whether “B” was presented with the terms and conditions in a manner that
provided him with an opportunity to make an informed decision. The threshold
for what constitutes an opportunity to make an informed decision has yet to be
determined. The other view would be that the requirement under Regulation
9(1)(c) leads to the creation of a tiered or layered contract. The question of an
act (i.e. clicking on the mouse) which gives rise to an agreement is treated as
being separate from the enforceability of the terms.104
The absence of case law in the UK illuminating the interpretation of the
regulations is not fatal as the questions that contract-formation disputes raise
have to some extent been considered in the United States and Canada.105 An
analogy can, for example, be drawn between the hypothetical case study and
ProCD v. Zeidenberg.106 In that case, goods were purchased by a customer and
payment made at the time of the order rather than upon receipt. It was held that
a binding commitment was created at the point in time that the shrink-wrapped
103. Regulations 2002, supra note 95.
104. Click-wrap contracts denote agreements placed on web pages. When filling an online agreement, 
consumers have to signify their assent to these terms by clicking on the mouse. See Radin, supra note 90.
Radin describes a machine-made contract as comprising a number of variants, notably those that involve
negotiations between two electronic agents, electronic enforcers and viral contracts.
105. See Phillip Johnson, “All Wrapped Up? A Review of the Enforceability of ‘Shrink-Wrap’ and ‘Click-Wrap’
Licenses in the United Kingdom and the United States” (2003) 25:2 Eur. I.P. Rev. 98-102. 
106. 86 F.3d 1447, <http://www.ca7.uscourts.gov/op3.fwx?yr=96&num=1139&Submit1=Request+Opinion> (7th
Cir. 1996) [ProCD].
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packaging was removed from the merchandise.107 The terms of the agreement
were presented at the time that the goods were delivered. An agreement could
not be constituted at the time that the purchase price was made since the con-
sumer had no knowledge of the terms. Easterbrook J.’s conclusion can be seen
as departing from the strictures of the narrative of offer and acceptance. His
approach seems to acknowledge that technology can lead to an altering of the
dynamics of power relations between the parties; manufacturers can control and
define when an agreement is constituted and also the terms applicable to the
relationship. It could be suggested that the recognition of the alteration of the
dynamics in contractual relations and the recognition of what constitutes accept-
able commercial norms and practices leads Easterbrook J. to advocate the idea
of “tiered contracting”: the content of the agreement is seen as being built grad-
ually in tandem with the ongoing communications between the parties.108 It is
pertinent to note that in reaching this conclusion the court was approaching the
issue of binding commitment through ex post facto rationalization. The court
placed particular emphasis, for example, on the overt act of the consumer
removing the shrink-wrap as evidence of assent and deemed this to be the
opportunity to review the terms of the licence.109 The opportunity, whether it was
taken or not, was deemed to constitute the legal relations.110
What this approach seems to suggest is that, whilst formalism has a par-
ticular value, the court—at least in this case—was prepared to accommodate the
technological dimensions in the contract-formation process. This approach
would seem to be very much in line with the balance that the regulations attempt
to strike between consumer welfare and the role of software in structuring rela-
tions. For instance, prior to an order being placed by the consumer, information
regarding the process of constituting the legal relations is to be provided in a
clear, comprehensible and unambiguous manner. “A” is therefore required to
provide information enabling “B” to identify and correct any input errors. The
omission of any provision enabling “A” to rewrite the agreement in view of its
107. Ibid. See also Hill v. Gateway 2000, 105 F.3d 1147, <http://www.ca7.uscourts.gov/op3.fwx?yr=96&num=
3294&Submit1=Request+Opinion> (7th Cir. 1997) [Gateway 2000 cited to F.3d]; Klocek v. Gateway, Inc.,
104 F.Supp. 2d 1332, <http://www.ksd.uscourts.gov/opinions/992499-36.html> (D. Kan. 2000) [Klocek
cited to F.Supp.].
108. Compare Step-Saver Data Systems v. Wyse Technology, 939 F. 2d 91 (3rd Cir. 1991); US Surgical Corp. v.
Orris, Inc., 5 F.Supp. 2d 1201 (D. Kan. 1998); Arizona Retail Systems v. Software Link, 831 F.Supp. 759 (Dist.
Ct. Ariz. 1993).
109. See Johnson, supra note 105 at 110.
110. See UCITA, supra note 95 at 59, 64, s. 112(a): “A person manifests assent to a record or term if the person,
acting with knowledge of, or after having an opportunity to review the record or term or a copy of it: (1)
authenticates the record or term with intent to adopt or accept it; or (2) intentionally engages in conduct
or makes statements with reason to know that the other party or its electronic agent may infer from the
conduct or statement that the person assents to the record or term.” Section 113: (a) “A person has an
opportunity to review a record or term only if it is made available in a manner that ought to call it to the
attention of a reasonable person and permit review”; (b) “An electronic agent has an opportunity to review
a record or term only if it is made available in a manner that would enable a reasonably configured elec-
tronic agent to react to the record or term”; (c) “If a record or term is available for review only after a per-
son becomes obligated to pay or begins its performance, the person has an opportunity to review only if it
has a right to a return if it rejects the record. However a right to a return is not required if: (1) the record
proposes a modification of contract or provides particulars of performance under Section 305; or (2) the
primary performance is other than delivery or acceptance of a copy, the agreement is not a mass market
transaction, and the parties at the time of contracting had reason to know that a record or term would be
presented after performance, use, or access to the information began.”
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own errors could be construed as being determinative of the parties’ rights and
expectations. Regulation 9(3) stipulates that, where a service provider provides
terms and conditions applicable to the contract to the recipient, the service
provider shall make them available to him in a way that allows him to store and
reproduce them. As previously noted, it is not entirely clear what the standard of
review is with regard to the issue of “informed decision making.” 
In Specht v. Netscape Communications Corp., it was observed by the
court that the act of downloading browser software did not bind the user to an
arbitration clause in the licensing agreement.111 This begs the question of what
would constitute affirmative assent. Consent, in the Specht situation, implies an
additional signification of agreement. The court seems to be acknowledging that
the architecture of code and the power to control the process of agreement for-
mation were matters with which consumers could not reasonably be expected to
be familiar. As the Court of Appeal stated: 
[A] reasonably prudent Internet user in circumstances such as these would not
have known or learned of the existence of the license terms before respond-
ing to defendant’s [Netscape’s] invitation to download the free software.112
In Specht, the “act” failed to attain the status of an “unambiguous mani-
festation of assent” because “[a]n offeree, regardless of apparent manifestation of
his consent, is not bound by inconspicuous contractual provisions of which he was
unaware, contained in a document whose contractual nature is not obvious.”113
This approach can be contrasted with the ruling in the Canadian case of
Rudder v. Microsoft Corporation where it was held that the forum-selection
clause in the click-wrap contract was enforceable against the plaintiffs.114 The
plaintiffs were seeking to avoid the jurisdiction clause by pointing to the format
of the click-wrap contract, which made genuine agreement elusive; in short, the
plaintiffs characterized the forum-selection clause as being fine print. Ironically,
whilst seeking to strike out the forum-selection clause, the plaintiffs were content
111. 150 F.Supp. 2d 585 (Dist. Ct. S.D.N.Y. 2001) [Specht]. See also Pollstar v. Gigmania Ltd., 170 F.Supp. 2d
974 (Dist. Ct. E.D. Cal. 2000) [Pollstar].
112. Specht, supra note 111 at p. 585.
113. Ibid.
114. (1999), 47 C.C.L.T. (2d) 168, (1999), 2 C.P.R. (4th) 474 (Ont. Sup. Ct.) [Rudder cited to C.C.L.T./C.P.R.]. The
relevant clause in the Member Agreement was as follows: “15.1 This Agreement is governed by the laws
of the State of Washington, U.S.A., and you consent to the exclusive jurisdiction and venue of courts in
King County, Washington, in all disputes arising out of or relating to your use of MSN or your MSN mem-
bership.” The plaintiff, contrary to the terms of the agreement, instituted legal proceedings against
Microsoft for breach of contract in Ontario.
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to accept the terms in the agreement that were favourable to their breach-of-
contract litigation.115
The ruling in Kanitz v. Rogers Cable Inc. illustrates the ease with which
method and process can be integrated into the way that courts reason about
binding commitments.116 The court in that case rejected the plaintiffs’ claim that
they had not agreed to the terms of the contract that enabled the defendants to
effectively create a “rolling contract” that would be updated through the trigger-
ing of specified notification procedures. After reviewing the process by which the
contractual relations were structured, the court made the following observations: 
115. Ibid. at paras. 13–17. In particular note the “clean-hands” rule being employed here. “Rudder admitted in
cross-examination on his affidavit that the entire agreement was readily viewable by using the scrolling func-
tion on the portion of the computer screen where the Membership Agreement was presented. Moreover,
Rudder acknowledged that he ‘scanned’ through part of the Agreement looking for ‘costs’ that would be
charged by MSN. He further admitted that once he had found the provisions relating to costs, he did not
read the rest of the Agreement. An excerpt from the transcript of Rudder’s cross-examination is illustrative:
Q. 314. I will now take you down to another section. I am now looking at heading 15, which is enti-
tled ‘General,’ and immediately underneath that is subsection 15. 1. Now, do I take it, when you
were scanning, you would have actually scanned past this, and you would have at least seen there
was a heading that said ‘General?’ Is that fair? Or did you not even scan all the way through? 
A. I did not go all the way down, I can honestly say. Once I found out what it would cost me, that
is where I would stop…”
“On cross-examination, Rudder admitted to having seen the screen containing the notice. In order
to replicate the conditions, portions of the cross-examination were conducted while Rudder was
being led through an actual sign-up process including the online connection portion. While online,
and after having been shown the notice posted above, Rudder responded to questioning as follows:
Q. 372. All right. You see immediately below the printing that we have just read, a rectangular box
that says, ‘MSN Premier Membership Rules?’ 
A. Yes…” 
“It is plain and obvious that there is no factual foundation for the plaintiffs’ assertion that any term
of the Membership Agreement was analogous to ‘fine print’ in a written contract. What is equally
clear is that the plaintiffs seek to avoid the consequences of specific terms of their agreement while
at the same time seeking to have others enforced. Neither the form of this contract nor its manner
of presentation to potential members are [sic] so aberrant as to lead to such an anomalous result.
To give effect to the plaintiffs’ argument would, rather than advancing the goal of ‘commercial cer-
tainty,’ to adopt the words of Huddart J.A. in Sarabia, move this type of electronic transaction into
the realm of commercial absurdity. It would lead to chaos in the marketplace, render ineffectual
electronic commerce and undermine the integrity of any agreement entered into through this
medium. On the present facts, the Membership Agreement must be afforded the sanctity that
must be given to any agreement in writing. The position of selectivity advanced by the plaintiffs
runs contrary to this stated approach, both in principle and on the evidence, and must be reject-
ed. Moreover, given that both of the representative plaintiffs are graduates of law schools and have
a professed familiarity with Internet services, their position is particularly indefensible.”
116. (2002), 58 O.R. (3d) 299, (2002), 16 C.P.C. (5th) 84 at para. 7 (Ont. Sup. Ct.) [Kanitz cited to O.R./C.P.C.].
The subscription service provided by Rogers@Home included a clause that provided for unilateral amend-
ments to the user agreement. The amendments were to be contractually binding on notification:
“Amendment. We may change, modify, add or remove portions of this Agreement at any time. We will
notify you of any changes to this Agreement by posting notice of such changes on the Rogers@Home web
site, or sending notice via email or postal mail. Your continued use of the Service following notice of such
change means that you agree to and accept the Agreement as amended. If you do not agree to any modi-
fication of this Agreement, you must immediately stop using Rogers@Home and notify us that you are ter-
minating this Agreement.” It remains to be seen whether the use of the terms in Kanitz passes the
“welfare-threshold” provisions in the EU consumer-protection enactments.
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The issue is whether there was notice given of the amendments as contem-
plated by the terms of the user agreement. I believe that there was. The user
agreement expressly allows the defendant to amend the user agreement and
to give notice of that fact through its web site. Each of the representative plain-
tiffs who was originally a customer of the defendant actually signed the user
agreement which contained this amending provision. Each of the representa-
tive plaintiffs who was originally a Shaw customer also signed a user agreement
which contained an amending provision. The Shaw customers were given rea-
sonable notice, when they became customers of the defendant pursuant to the
swap, of the terms of service and other matters relating to the provision of the
service by the defendant. It would not be unreasonable to expect that those
customers would take the time to visit the appropriate sections of the defen-
dant’s web site to familiarize themselves with the defendant’s terms of service
if they were interested in knowing what those terms of service were and
whether they differed in any material respect from those of Shaw.117
No matter how hard we try to think that architecture assumes a nominal
role, the court seems to be reaching for a compromise in ensuring that the
responsibilities are distributed in an even-handed manner. The theme of reason-
ableness is used to mediate the power relations: 
In my view, therefore, the former Shaw customers became bound by the
defendant’s amending provision once they became customers of the defen-
dant pursuant to the swap and continued to use the defendant’s service. The
effect of the terms of the amending provision in the user agreement, in my
view, is to place an obligation on the customer, who is interested in any
amendments that the defendant may choose to make to the user agreement,
to check the web site from time to time to determine if such amendments
have been made. Further, in order to check for such changes, I do not accept
that the customer can reasonably assert that all he or she should have to do
is simply go to the main screen of the defendant’s web site and expect to find
a notice regarding any such amendments. The defendant is a large company
with many different interests, all of which are represented on its web site.
Cable Internet access customers, who are the only customers who we are con-
cerned with here, can reasonably be required to visit that portion of the web
site dealing with the Internet access aspect of the defendant’s business to find
such a notice. Such a customer can also be reasonably required, once at the
Internet access portion of the web site, to have to go to that portion of that
site where the defendant’s policies and agreements are maintained to find
any such notice. One would not expect to look for such a notice in those por-
tions of the web site dealing with other matters, such as “View and Pay Bills”
or “Price Comparison” or “Store Locator” or any of the other different por-
tions of the web site.118
This is an important clarification. More significantly, it also reflects the
extent to which the benchmarks for what constitutes a binding commitment will
depend on evidence of established commercial practices and consumer familiar-
117. Ibid. at paras. 22–23.
118. Ibid. at paras. 23–24.
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ity with the online technology: 
The evidence establishes that had any of the plaintiffs taken the time to go to
the Customer Support section of the Internet access portion of the defen-
dant’s web site, they would have seen a notice that the user agreement had
been amended. Further, if they had ever reviewed the user agreement on the
web site, they would have also known of the fact that the defendant posts the
last change date for the user agreement and they could have easily deter-
mined therefrom whether any further changes had been made to the user
agreement since the date they last checked for any amendments. In either way,
they would receive notice of any changes made. While the plaintiffs make
much of the fact that the defendant could have, but did not, send e-mail noti-
fications to customers of the amendments to the user agreement, the fact is
that e-mail notification is a separate mode of communication authorized by the
amending provision. As long as the defendant uses one authorized method, it
cannot be faulted for not having used another. I conclude, therefore, that the
defendant did give notice of the amendments as required by the user agree-
ment. The evidence also establishes that each of the plaintiffs continued to use
the defendant’s service subsequent to the posting of the notice and the
amended user agreement. Under the terms of the user agreement, therefore,
they were each deemed to have accepted the amendments.119
The issue of whether a binding commitment has been concluded will
continue to exercise the minds of the judiciary and policy-makers as online con-
sumer-purchasing activity becomes pervasive. It would be churlish to regard the
approach adopted by the Canadian court in Kanitz as one that is likely to become
the norm. In America Online, Inc. v. Booker, it was held that an agreement with
an Internet Service Provider was valid.120 The court reasoned that the choice-of-
forum clause was not unconscionable or unreasonable. In Caspi v. Microsoft
Network, the inclusion of icons to enable a user to signify his assent or dis-
agreement was regarded by the court as being sufficient to hold that the click-
through agreement was valid.121 In Specht, an arbitration clause was deemed not
to have been enforceable because it was not apparent from the website whether
assent was required.122 Finally, in Ticketmaster Corp. v. Tickets.Com Inc., it was
observed that terms governing the use of the website (i.e. deep linking, copying)
were not binding on the user.123 The absence of any button requiring the user to
signify his assent was regarded as being fatal. 
The only conclusion that seems permissible at this relatively early phase of
the internet’s emergence as a viable market of commerce is that the questions of
binding commitment will boil down to a policy question of whether the law should
119. Ibid. at paras. 25–26.
120. 781 So. 2d 423 (3 Dist. Ct. App. Fla. 2001) [Booker]. See also America Online v. Superior Court, 108 Cal.
Rptr. 2d 699 (1 Dist. Ct. App. 2001) [America Online].
121. 732 A.2d 528, <http://lawlibrary.rutgers.edu/courts/appellate/a2182-97.opn.html> (N.J. Sup. Ct. A.D.
1999) [Caspi cited to A.2d.]. The users were presented with two boxes—“I Agree” and “I Don’t Agree”—
and these were placed alongside the terms of the agreement, which users could scroll through with the
mouse. See also Compuserve v. Patterson, 89 F.3d 1257 (6th Cir. 1996) [Compuserve].
122. Supra note 111.
123. 2000 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 12987 (C.D. Cal. 2000) [Ticketmaster].
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now use as a benchmark the innocent-but-unsavvy internet surfer or the informed-
and-calculating internet surfer intending to benefit at another’s expense.124
*
5. CONCLUSION: WHITHER THE PARADOX?
AT FIRST BLUSH, commentators faced with issues of online contract formation
intuitively turn to the traditional narrative of contract law. The characterization of
technology in terms of method leads to an overemphasis on the universal reach
of contract principles. The paper advocates in favour of three arguments in
defending the thesis that governance challenges in the online environment can-
not be viewed purely in terms of contract narratives. The first argument is that
contract rules provide a preliminary but not exhaustive account. Rule-application
analysis, I suggest, cannot be conflated with the prior but overlooked question
of the core and reach of binding commitments. 
The second argument is that technology is mischaracterized as method.
A corollary to this argument is that consent is process. The methods of commu-
nication and computer software pose important conceptual questions about the
nature of a binding commitment. Should this be overlooked, the ideals and val-
ues we associate with the law of contract may be compromised by code. This
oversight will have clear implications for the way that we attempt to evaluate the
Electronic Commerce (EC Directive) Regulations 2002 in terms of their ability to
protect the values embedded in contract law. As businesses and individuals
become reliant on the new methods of data processing and transmission it is
contended that governance structures and relationships cannot remain unaffect-
ed. Indeed, to insist on the artificial distinction of method and process merely
delays the integration of the technological challenges into a coherent theoretical
framework. The continued reluctance to confront the challenges posed by tech-
nology may not be an option because policy-makers have already recognized the
need to accommodate this new phenomenon in the context of binding commit-
ments. This is the paradox of online contracting. 
The third argument is that we can reconcile the above-mentioned regu-
lations with the ideals of contract law. Its provisions recognize the imbalance in
the power relations that the design values of the technological infrastructure cre-
ate and potentially embody. The history of consent and of the various exceptions
to its requirement tell us that contract law, whilst aspiring to the ideals, has
always been concerned with the realities. The danger in not recognizing this is
that it distracts us from recognizing that the architecture of the internet raises
124. See Distance Selling Regulations 2000, supra note 98. Regulation 11(2) attempts to clarify the status of the
postal rule with regard to online contracts: (a) “the order and the acknowledgement of receipt will be
deemed to be received when the parties to whom they are addressed are able to access them; and (b) the
acknowledgement of receipt may take the form of the provision of the service paid for where that service
is an information society service.” It may be that inactivity on the part of the consumer, which brings him
outside the cooling-off period of the Distance Selling Regulations 2000, may be seen as a cut-off period.
The importance placed by Parliament on the obligations being taken seriously and on consumers not
being deceived is underscored by regulation 13. This provision states unequivocally that “[t]he duties
imposed by regulations 6, 7, 8, 9(1) and 11(1)(a) shall be enforceable, at the suit of any recipient of a ser-
vice, by an action against the service provider for damages for breach of statutory duty.”
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some serious questions about contract formation where the absence of consent
may have far-reaching consequences for consumers and for their trust in this
medium for forming contracts. It is hoped that this paper provides sufficient jus-
tification for undertaking a serious debate about the way that consent ought to
be conceptualized in cyberspace.
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